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The ad hoc institutional configurations that facilitated the resolution of sovereign insolvency for over thirty
years are fragmenting. Recent court decisions interpreting the pari passu clause in sovereign debt contracts
reveal the dangers of pressuring common law courts to enforce contracts and mediate structural flaws in the
market. The courts have dismantled sovereign protections in international law and common law checks and
balances. They have gone beyond precedent to innovate remedies justified by interpreting a clause whose
meaning and function were not clearly understood by the contracting parties themselves. They have also
opened up a possible inter-creditor obligation that circumvents sovereign immunity legislation. This
obligation imperils third party property protections and exposes the US clearing system to creditor remedies.
The article argues that the current challenges require the courts to play an inadvertent, expansive regulatory
role. To fulfil this role they must ensure that creditors enjoy their property (debt) without constraints and
assume away the resulting externalities. In effect, enforcement sustains the legal fiction that debt is a
commodity. Legal recognition of this fiction obviates negotiated debt workouts, which are premised on
suspending this commodity form. The article dispels the idea that the possibility of enforcement in sovereign
debt markets brings us closer to achieving the legal regime theorized as the neutral backdrop of competitive
markets.
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Sovereign Debt as a Commodity:  
A Contract Law Perspective
DANIA THOMAS*
The ad hoc institutional configurations that facilitated the resolution of sovereign insolvency 
for over thirty years are fragmenting. Recent court decisions interpreting the pari passu 
clause in sovereign debt contracts reveal the dangers of pressuring common law courts to 
enforce contracts and mediate structural flaws in the market. The courts have dismantled 
sovereign protections in international law and common law checks and balances. They 
have gone beyond precedent to innovate remedies justified by interpreting a clause whose 
meaning and function were not clearly understood by the contracting parties themselves. 
They have also opened up a possible inter-creditor obligation that circumvents sovereign 
immunity legislation. This obligation imperils third party property protections and exposes 
the US clearing system to creditor remedies. The article argues that the current challenges 
require the courts to play an inadvertent, expansive regulatory role. To fulfil this role they 
must ensure that creditors enjoy their property (debt) without constraints and assume away 
the resulting externalities. In effect, enforcement sustains the legal fiction that debt is a 
commodity. Legal recognition of this fiction obviates negotiated debt workouts, which are 
premised on suspending this commodity form. The article dispels the idea that the possibility 
of enforcement in sovereign debt markets brings us closer to achieving the legal regime 
theorized as the neutral backdrop of competitive markets.
Les configurations institutionnelles ad hoc qui ont facilité le règlement de l’insolvabilité des 
États pendant plus de trente ans sont en cours de fragmentation. Les récentes décisions 
judiciaires qui ont interprété la clause pari passu dans les contrats de dette souveraine 
révèlent qu’il est dangereux de faire pression sur les tribunaux de common law en vue de 
faire exécuter les contrats et de traiter les failles structurelles du marché. Les tribunaux ont 
démantelé les protections souveraines offertes dans le cadre des freins et contrepoids en 
droit international et en common law. Ils ont établi de nouveaux recours sans précédent en 
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s’appuyant sur l’interprétation d’une clause dont le sens et la fonction n’étaient pas clairement 
compris par les parties contractantes elles-mêmes. Ils ont également ouvert la voie à une 
éventuelle obligation entre créanciers qui vient contourner la législation sur l’immunité 
souveraine. Cette obligation met en péril les protections à l’égard des biens des tiers et 
expose le système de compensation des États-Unis aux recours intentés par les créanciers. 
Le présent article avance que, compte tenu des défis actuels, les tribunaux doivent jouer 
un rôle réglementaire discret et étendu. Pour remplir ce rôle, ils doivent s’assurer que les 
créanciers jouissent de leurs biens (dette) sans contraintes en ignorant les externalités qui en 
résultent. Dans les faits, l’exécution des contrats entretient la fiction juridique selon laquelle 
la dette est une marchandise. Or, la reconnaissance juridique de cette fiction rend inutiles 
les restructurations négociées des dettes, qui supposent la suspension de cette forme de 
marchandise. L’article réfute l’idée selon laquelle la possibilité d’appliquer des mesures 
d’exécution sur les marchés de la dette souveraine nous rapproche de l’établissement d’un 
régime juridique servant de toile de fond neutre aux marchés concurrentiels.
THE AD HOC INSTITUTIONAL CONFIGURATIONS that facilitated the resolution of 
sovereign insolvency for over thirty years are fragmenting. In the absence of an 
acceptable alternative, recent court decisions1 interpreting the pari passu clause in 
sovereign debt contracts reveal the danger of pressuring common law courts to 
enforce contracts and paper over structural fissures in the market. The courts have 
dismantled international law protections and common law checks and balances 
1. Allied Bank International v Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F Supp 1440 (Dist 
Court New York, 1983); 733 F 2d 23 (Court of Appeals, 1984) [Allied I]; 757 F 2d 516 
(2nd Circuit 1985) [Allied II]; NML Capital, Ltd v Republic of Argentina, No.08 Civ.6978 
(TPG) (SDNY, December 7, 2011) [NML pari passu decision]; No.08 Civ.6978 (TPG) 
(SDNY, Feb 23, 2012) [NML injunction order]; 2012 WL 5895786 (SDNY Nov 21 2012) 
[NML payment formula]; 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir 2012) [NML I]; 727 F.3d 230, 238 (2d Cir 
2013) [NML II].
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while going beyond precedent to craft new remedies that are ostensibly justified 
by interpreting a clause whose meaning and function was not clearly understood 
by the contracting parties themselves at the time of the contract. The courts 
have implicitly recognised inter-creditor obligations that circumvents sovereign 
immunity legislation. This invention imperils third party property protections 
and exposes the US clearing system to creditor remedies.
This article takes a step back from the pari passu dispute and discusses the 
(arguably long term) consequences of judicial intervention from a contract law 
perspective. The article argues that the current challenges faced by the courts 
require them to play an inadvertent yet expansive regulatory role. To fulfil this role, 
they must ensure that creditors enjoy their property (debt) without constraints 
and assume away the resulting externalities. In effect, enforcement sustains the 
legal fiction that debt is a commodity. Legal recognition of this fiction obviates 
negotiated debt workouts, which, by definition, are premised on a suspension 
of this commodity form. The article concludes with a discussion of the nature 
of legal indeterminacy, dispelling the idea that the possibility of enforcement in 
sovereign debt markets brings us closer to achieving a legal regime that functions 
as the neutral backdrop of competitive markets.
Sovereign debt crises are complicated and disruptive,2 yet since the 1980s 
they have been resolved through widespread, market-driven, consensual debt 
workouts.3 In most cases of default, a majority of sovereign creditors consent 
to restructure their debt while the minority that holds out is repaid in full at 
the margins.4 For over thirty years, workouts were achieved through an ad hoc 
but effective mix of informal cooperation, market arrangements and formal 
interventions by the official sector.5 During this period, the sovereign debt 
2. Robert Z Aliber & Charles P Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of 
Financial Crises, 7th ed (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Mitu Gulati & Robert 
E Scott, The Three and a Half Minute Transaction: Boilerplate and the Limits of Contract 
Design (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013); Rosa Lastra & Lee Buchheit, eds, 
Sovereign Debt Management (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
3. Lee C Buchheit “Sovereign Debt Restructurings: the Legal Context” (BIS Papers No 72, 
107) delivered at the Bank for International Settlements, July 2013, online: <www.ssrn.com/
abstract=2473986> [unpublished]; Udaibir S Das, Michael G Papaioannou & Christopher 
Trebesch, “Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized 
Facts” (2012) International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No WP/12/203.
4. Arturo C Porzecanski, “From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of Argentina’s 
Default” (2005) 6:1 Chicago J Int’l L 311 at 314.
5. Jérôme Sgard, “How the IMF did it—sovereign debt restructuring between 1970 and 1989” 
(2016) 11:1 CMLJ 103 at 118. See also Anna Gelpern, “Sovereign Debt: Now What?” 
online: (2016) 41:2 Yale J Int’l L at 119-23 <campuspress.yale.edu/yjil>.
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restructuring community’s repeated reliance on such arrangements constrained 
judicial intervention as “market participants did not treat this routine restructuring 
process as a violation of bond covenants.”6 This situation has changed. Since the 
sovereign debt crises in Argentina,7 Greece,8 and Ukraine,9 there is now disturbing 
evidence that the institutional configurations that sustained debt workouts can 
no longer be taken for granted. Presently, there is no acceptable alternative to 
these essentially ad hoc, customised configurations, as the market and structural 
conditions that made them possible have shifted.10 This article examines the 
changing role of the judiciary in the face of this transition. This examination 
is informed by an emerging consensus in the literature that, in the absence of a 
viable alternative, the courts will be pressured to play a more expansive role and 
intervene in disputes they are poorly positioned to resolve.11
As parties to simple debt contracts, a sovereign’s creditors are guaranteed 
access to the courts. On default there is often “a rush to the courthouse.”12 
6. Gelpern, ibid at 104. For a description of the “sovereign debt restructuring community,” see 
Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, “Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study” (2006) 84 
Wash U L Rev 1627.
7. Brad Setser & Anna Gelpern, “Pathways through Financial Crises: Argentina” (2006) 12 
Global Governance 465.
8. Gelpern supra note 5 at 129-37.
9. Neil Buckley, Roman Olearchyk & Shawn Donnan, “Legal Fight Looms over Ukraine’s 
$3bn debt to Russia” Financial Times (15 October 2015), online: <www.ft.com/content/
f7a04f1e-7354-11e5-bdb1-e6e4767162cc>.
10. Gene Frieda, “Sovereign Debt Markets” in Lastra & Buchheit, supra note 2, 287. Here, 
Frieda also discusses the cyclical and structural changes in the market preceding and 
following the 2008 financial crises. The possibility of an alternative has been repeatedly 
raised by multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the United Nations, though none 
have been accepted. See Anne Krueger, “International Financial Architecture for 2002: 
A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring” (Address delivered at the National 
Economists’ Club Annual Members’ Dinner of the American Enterprise Institute of 
Washington, DC, 26 November 2001) [unpublished], online: <www-personal.umich.
edu/~kathrynd/IMFDebtRestructuring.Krueger.pdf>. For an introduction to the UNCTAD 
debt restructuring initiative, see Yuefen Li, “Lessons learned from debt crisis and ongoing 
work on sovereign debt restructuring and debt resolution mechanisms” (Address delivered 
at ECOSOC Special Meeting on External Debt Sustainability, New York, 23 April 2013) 
[unpublished], online: <www.un.org/esa/ffd/ecosoc/debt/2013/presentation_Li.pdf>.
11. This view is consistent with empirical evidence that indicates a significant increase in 
sovereign debt litigation. See W Mark C Weidemaier & Ryan McCarl, “Creditor Remedies” 
in Lastra & Buchhei, supra note 2, 139 at 143; Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch & 
Henrik Enderlein, “Sovereign defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor Litigation” (2014) at 
10, online: <www.ssrn.com/abstract=2189997>. See also Gelpern, supra note 5.
12. For evidence of a rush to the courthouse in Argentina and Peru, see Schumacher, Trebesch & 
Enderlein, ibid at 11.
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However, for all intents and purposes, sovereign debt contracts are unenforceable 
and have been so since sovereign states reacted to the adoption of restricted 
immunity regimes by immunizing their attachable assets from creditor suits.13 
But in 2012, for the first time in the history of sovereign debt, debtor obligations 
became enforceable in US law14 and the problem of weak enforcement was at an 
end. However, the possibility of enforcement elicited more negative than positive 
responses from scholars and markets alike.15
Argentina refused to countenance some creditor claims, and in the face of 
this intransigence courts were under pressure to interpret the pari passu clause 
in sovereign bond contracts16 in a manner that papered over confusion about its 
meaning in the market.17 Pari passu clauses are standard terms in debt contracts 
that specify how creditors will be paid in the event of a default. A well-developed 
literature examines the implications of this clause and the deep confusion over 
its meaning amongst market actors and the official sector.18 This article’s inquiry 
into the judicial role and the wider questions about the role of law in sustaining 
debt markets is motivated by the fundamental indeterminacy in the meaning of 
a standard term in bond contracts.
Another implication of the pari passu decisions is the real possibility that an 
expansive post-default judicial role will stymie consensual debt workouts and 
in the process lengthen debt crises, require extensive and potentially significant 
taxpayer-funded bailouts, and impose unremitting austerity on the citizens 
13. In the US, legislation was tabled to restrict the absolute sovereign immunity protections 
sovereigns enjoyed in international law. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 
USC § 1605 (1976).
14. NML I, supra note 1.
15. For a discussion of the rejection of the court’s ratable payment interpretation of the 
clause, see Lee C Buchheit & Jeremiah S Pam, “The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt 
Instruments” (2004) 53 Emory LJ 869 at 877-91; for an argument that the rateable payment 
interpretation was contrary to conventional understanding of the clause, see G Mitu Gulati 
& Kenneth N Klee, “Sovereign Piracy” (2001) 56:2 The Business Lawyer 635 at 650. 
Positive responses were largely confined to judgment-holders and the courts. For views in 
favour of the ratable payment interpretation in US law and third party injunctions see Brief 
for Amicus Curiae Kenneth W Dam in support of Affirmance, NML I, supra note 1; Brief of 
Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees Urging Affirmance, 
ibid. A market association responded by providing a template of the clause. See International 
Capital Market Association, “Collective action clauses,” online: <www.icmagroup.
org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/Primary-Markets/primary-market-topics/
collective-action-clauses> [ICMA].
16. See Buchheit & Pam, ibid.
17. ICMA, supra note 15.
18. See Gulati & Scott, supra note 2.
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of debtor states.19 The decline of the ad hoc institutional configurations that 
evolved to achieve earlier debt workouts is an opportunity to better understand 
how enforcement action by the courts stymies consensual market-driven debt 
workouts. According to Lee Buchheit and Elena Daley the chemistry that 
sustains debt workouts relies on a mixture of a sovereign’s “unique vulnerability 
to creditor lawsuits” and their “unique degree of protection against creditor 
remedies.”20 In the absence of attachable sovereign assets, the courts enforce 
debt obligations by threatening the attachment of third-party claims and back 
their threat by enjoining the US clearing system. In so doing they both peel 
back this protection and enhance sovereign vulnerability. In the absence of 
countervailing formal or informal authority that can restore this “chemistry” and 
limit judicial intervention, debt workouts are in jeopardy. As has been discussed 
in the literature, NML does seem to offer “a unique remedy for a unique case.”21 
However, the NML route to judicial enforcement has ramifications beyond the 
four corners of a contract dispute. In the absence of non-judicial restraints on 
enforcement, I expect that this issue will recur in the future.22
There are two views on the nature of the institutional configurations that 
facilitated debt workouts.23 José Ocampo characterises this thirty-year period as 
a chaotic “non-system” reactive to conflicting and disparate creditor interests. 
Debt workouts, if and when they happened, were random events. Anna Gelpern, 
on the other hand, argues that there was order in these unique configurations: 
Coordination between the informal Paris and London clubs24 was reinforced 
by formal organizations such as the IMF and buttressed in the early period by 
long term relationships between commercial banks and debtor states. Though 
the balance Ocampo tracks between creditor rights and sovereign protections 
reflects the fundamental chemistry that sustains debt workouts mentioned 
19. Gelpern, supra note 5 at 46.
20. Lee C Buchheit & Elena L Daley, “Minimising Holdout Creditors: Carrots” in Lastra & 
Buchheit, supra note 2, 4.
21. Weidemaier, supra note 11 at 149.
22. This is consistent with the view that, from a contract law perspective, sovereign debt 
litigation represents the “hard cases that make bad law.” See Anna Gelpern “Contract Hope 
and Sovereign Redemption” (2013) 8:2 CMLR 132 at 133.
23. José Antonio Ocampo, “A Brief History of Sovereign Debt Resolution and a Proposal for 
a Multilateral Instrument” in Martin Guzman, José Antonio Ocampo & Joseph E Stiglitz, 
eds, Too Little, Too Late: The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2016) 190 at 192; Gelpern, supra note 5.
24. The Paris Club comprises a group of officials from major creditor countries whose role is to 
find co-ordinated and sustainable solutions to payment difficulties experienced by debtor 
states. The London Club is an informal group of major private creditors set up to discuss 
debt restructurings. See online: <www.clubdeparis.org>.
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above, he sheds no light on what sustained debt workouts. Gelpern fills this 
gap by highlighting key factors such as “[c]hanging capital flows, old creditors’ 
weakening commitment to past practices,”25 and the absence of an acceptable 
alternative that market actors would coalesce behind. Both authors propose ways 
to negotiate the current period, in which debt workouts are no longer inevitable 
as market outcomes.26 This article builds on this new consensus to track the 
parallel and evolving judicial role over the same period.
The article examines three decades of post-default enforcement litigation. 
Over this period the courts consistently expanded their remit, setting the scene 
for the current situation in which it is now possible to shoehorn the complexity 
of a sovereign debt crisis and market-driven resolution into the four corners 
of a simple debt dispute. In this situation, judicial intervention is confined by 
contract law imperatives such as freedom to contract, consent, and enforceable 
promises to pay. The courts must strive to sustain “the semi-fiction that sovereign 
bonds create legally enforceable obligations.”27 However, this fiction works only 
as long as debt obligations are serviced. On default, the contract law imperatives 
that bind the court come up against the complexity of a debt crisis. This sets the 
conditions for an expansive judicial role. Argentina is a case in point—it refused to 
repay hold-out creditors while continuing to service its debt obligations to other 
creditors who participated in two debt workouts. In the absence of overarching 
institutional interventions such as an attempt by the IMF to rein in Argentina’s 
behaviour,28 the judicial impulse to intervene is triggered.29 In this process of 
25. Gelpern, supra note 5 at 46; W Mark C Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, “A People’s History of 
Collective Action Clauses” (2013) 54:1 Va J Int’l L 56. When compared to the period that 
preceded securitization of debt in the 1980s, contemporary bondholders are widely dispersed 
and have differing interests.
26. Gelpern, supra note 5 at 46.
27. Weidemaier, supra note 11 at 149.
28. Argentina for instance, had repaid its IMF loans by this time. An IMF presence could 
arguably have changed the behaviour that triggered this outcome. For a discussion on the 
judicial reaction to Argentina’s behaviour, see Gelpern, supra note 5 at 69.
29. See e.g. NML II, supra note 1 at 23. This case characterizes Argentina’s behaviour as 
“recalcitrant” as it refused to repay litigating creditors while continuing to repay non-party 
exchange bondholders. For justifications of this enforcement role in sovereign debt litigation, 
see Andrei Schleifer, “Will the Sovereign Debt Market Survive?” (2003) National Bureau 
of Economic Research Working Paper No 9493, online: <http://www.nber.org.ezproxy.
library.yorku.ca/papers/w9493>; Hal S Scott, “Sovereign Debt Default: Cry for the United 
States Not Argentina” (2006) Washington Legal Foundation Working Paper No 140, online: 
<http://www.wlf.org/upload/Scott%20WP%20Final.pdf>; Michael P Dooley, “International 
financial architecture and strategic default: can financial crises be less painful?” (2000) 53:1 
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 361. This impulse is also justified by 
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judicial intervention, and within the constraints of contract law, sovereign debt 
acquires its commodity form. This article’s examination of the courts’ expanded 
enforcement role delineates the commodification of sovereign debt that occurs 
via judicial actions that secure the litigating creditors’ enjoyment of their bonds30 
irrespective of sovereign credit risks31 and of the negative consequences for 
non-party creditors and the wider market.32
In contract law, enforcement protects the intangible property claims of 
creditors to payment. What is the nature of these property claims? Should these 
claims be protected as commodities—immutable, abstract, and inviolable? If so, 
at what cost? And who will eventually pay? Is enforcement justified at the cost 
of delayed workouts that disproportionately impose costs on “citizens, taxpayers, 
bank depositors and pensioners,”33 leading sovereigns to lose “their capacity 
to meet the basic human needs of their citizens and to safeguard their human 
the need to uphold the rule of law signalling the established superiority of US law and legal 
institutions and drawing a clear line between the US and other societies that have so far been 
unable “to develop effective, low cost enforcement of contracts” which is viewed as “the most 
important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the 
Third World.” For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Carmine D Boccuzzi Jr, Michael M 
Brennan & Jacob H Johnson “Defences” in Lastra & Buchheit, supra note 2 at 103. Secretary 
General Kofi Annan provides a global view in his Address to the US Chamber of Commerce 
in June of 1999 where he stated that “... without rules governing contracts and property 
rights; without confidence based on the rule of law; without trust and transparency—there 
could be no well-functioning markets. We know this when it comes to national economies, 
but we have yet to apply it fully to global markets.” United Nations, Press Release, SG/
SM/7022 “Secretary-General, Addressing United States Chamber of Commerce, Highlights 
Fundamental Shift of United Nations Attitude Towards Private Sector” (8 June 1999), 
online: <http://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990608.SGSM7022.html>.
30. Juan J Cruces & Tim R Samples, “Settling Sovereign Debt’s ‘Trial of the Century’” (2016) 31 
Emory Int’l L Rev 5.
31. For a discussion of the implications of markets ignoring sovereign credit risk in the lead up to 
the financial crisis of 2008, see Frieda, supra note 10 at 287; S I Strong, “Rogue Debtors and 
unanticipated Risk” (2014) 35:4 U Pa J Int’l L 1139.
32. W Mark C Weidemaier & Gelpern Anna, “Injunctions in Sovereign Debt Litigation” (2014) 
31:1 Yale J on Reg 189.at 192; Julian Schumacher, “Sovereign Debt Litigation in Argentina: 
Implications of the Pari Passu Default” 1:1 JFR 143; Tim R Samples, “Rogue Trends in 
Sovereign Debt: Argentina, Vulture Funds, and Pari Passu Under New York Law” (2014) 
35:1 Nw J Int L & Bus 49 at 76; Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, “The Pari Passu Interpretation 
in the Elliott Case: A Brilliant Strategy but an Awful (Mid-Long Term) Outcome?” (2011) 
40:1 Hofstra L Rev 39.
33. Gelpern, supra note 5 at 46.
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rights.”34 More generally, enforcement opens up questions about the role of the 
law in sovereign debt markets. Is the legal recognition of debt as a commodity 
a turning point? Does this recognition signal an incipient legal regime that will 
ensure the achievement of efficient outcomes in competitive markets, or is it 
a second-best intervention that should trigger instead a call for the exercise of 
public authority to sustain market-driven debt workouts and, in the process, 
limit the judicial role?35
This article draws out the implications of the property claim in what are 
contractual disputes. This focus is informed by an incipient literature that engages 
in a similar exercise in relation to the regulation of financial market transactions.36 
Sovereign debt litigation opens up an interesting inquiry into the judicial role in 
this relatively underdeveloped37 area of research. The recognition of debt as a 
commodity allows the courts to influence both its transferability and assignability, 
opening up the possibility of injunctions. In the absence of countervailing 
34. Ibid. For a discussion of the empirical evidence of the health outcomes of austerity imposed 
on the Greek population, see Stuckler David & Sanjay Basu, The Body Economic: Why 
Austerity Kills (New York: Basic Books, 2013).
35. For proposals on how to limit the judicial role through amendments to the IMF Articles and 
within the existing statutory framework in the Eurozone, see Committee on International 
Economic Policy and Reform, Revisiting Sovereign Bankruptcy: Brookings Report (CIEPR, 
October 2013) at 21-28, 29-35, online <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2016/06/CIEPR_2013_RevisitingSovereignBankruptcyReport.pdf> [Sovereign 
Bankruptcy]. This was also the gist of the law passed by the Belgian Government in 2005. 
The law was published on 28 December 2004, and entered into force on 7 January 2005. 
It stated: “Any cash settlement account maintained with the operator of a system or with 
a cash settlement agent, as well as any cash transfer, through a Belgian or foreign credit 
institution, to be credited to such cash settlement account, cannot be attached, put under 
sequestration or otherwise blocked by any means by a participant (other than the operator 
or the settlement agent), a counterpart or a third party.” See National Bank of Belgium, 
Financial Stability Review 2005 (June) at 163, online: <www.nbb.be/doc/ts/publications/fsr/
fsr_2005_en.pdf>.
36. Heather Hughes, “Financial Product Complexity, Moral Hazard and the Private Law” (2015) 
20 Stan J L Bus & Fin 179. Here, Hughes identifies “a shift from a contract law to a property 
law rubric” in interventions to regulate the transactional complexity of financial products and 
opens up a discussion on new modes of regulatory intervention that follow the property in 
financial products (ibid at 182).
37. “The normative implications of a property-oriented view of financial products are 
under-developed” (ibid at 189).
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legislative or regulatory authority to limit this intervention, third-party rights 
and the clearing system are imperilled—potentially without restraint.38
 The commodification of sovereign debt has arisen in litigation related 
to private lending by creditors based in US capital markets. The contract law 
framing of the disputes is a feature of foreign debt issuances by emerging market 
sovereigns.39 Though the US is a significant jurisdiction for debt issuances, 
disputes under US law are not representative of sovereign debt disputes 
generally.40 The issuances in dispute were large but a small subset of total bond 
issuances.41 It follows then that the contract law perspective developed here is 
not aimed to explain either all sovereign debt litigation or the judicial role in 
other jurisdictions. Recent empirical evidence of a significant rise in sovereign 
debt litigation suggests, however, that the perspective developed here would be 
generally relevant for litigation in common law jurisdictions.42
The article proceeds as follows. Part I analyses sovereign debt litigation from 
just before the securitization of debt in 1980 to the present. Building on earlier 
litigation that established the sanctity of contract paradigm, this Part delineates an 
incipient contract as property paradigm and examines the contract law justification 
for enforcement, namely securing creditors’ enjoyment of their property. Part 
II examines the nature of this property claim in contract law doctrine. This 
discussion is focused on the promissory theory of contract and draws out the 
promissory basis of the property claim. This basis is central to an understanding 
38. There were parallel concerns raised in early debates about the role of the courts in recognising 
the assignability of shares prior to the promulgation of company law statutes in the UK. 
Briefly, shares were contracts and, as choses in action, were unassignable in the absence 
of public authority that suspended the contract form and recognised its assignable and 
transferable property form. A discussion of this literature and its relevance to US law 
and sovereign debt are beyond the scope of this paper. For an overview of these cases see 
Ireland Paddy, “Property and Contract in Contemporary Corporate Theory” (2003) 23:3 
LS 454 at 459-60.
39. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 6.
40. Debt is also issued in other legal jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, Japan, and by 
EU sovereigns such as Germany and Greece.
41. Alejandro Díaz De León, “Mexico’s adoption of new standards in international sovereign 
debt contracts: CACs, pari passu and a trust indenture” (2016) 11:1 CMLJ 12. Domestic 
debt issuances are generally much larger than foreign bond issuances. In the case of Mexico 
for instance, “as of June 2015, close to 80% of the total debt was issued in local markets and 
domestic currency, while in 1995 80 % of the debt portfolio was external debt” (ibid at 13). 
See also Frieda, supra note 10.
42. The litigation dataset complied by Schumacher, Trebesch, & Enderlein indicate a significant 
increase in litigation in the 2000s when compared to the 1980s. They attribute this increase 
to diversification in demand. See Schumacher, Trebesch & Enderlein, supra note 11 at 1.
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of the commodity form that debt takes in judicial deliberations. The implications 
of these legal changes are discussed in Part III. This Part highlights how a legal 
fiction is established in the context of metaphorical and literal markets. The debt 
resolution system’s reliance on a legal fiction reveals the inherent indeterminacy 
of the law. As the legal fiction is conceptually incompatible with debt workouts, 
enforcement skews the distribution of the costs of sovereign debt repayment 
disputes towards the debtor and away from its creditors. Part IV discusses the 
nature of legal indeterminacy and presents conclusions.
I. FROM ALLIED TO NML: THE EVOLVING COMMODITY 
FORM OF DEBT
A sovereign debt dispute is, by definition, a political dispute. The repayment of 
debt, once issued, lays a claim to a dedicated stream of sovereign resources for 
sometimes considerable lengths of time. The economic shock that triggers default 
and the subsequent imposition of austerity and structural adjustment have 
disruptive systemic effects on the economy and the political fabric of the debtor 
state. Almost simultaneously, in a parallel universe of abstract legal concepts 
including ‘property,’ ‘liability,’ and ‘sovereign defences,’ the sovereign becomes a 
defendant in a contract enforcement dispute. As such, it is far from a free nation 
that can exercise its discretion in any way it deems necessary to deal with the crisis 
that triggered the default. The dispute is resolved in a domain insulated from that 
of discretionary sovereign acts. This Part begins with a discussion of the Allied 
set of cases, which set the benchmark for judicial intervention in sovereign debt 
markets.43 This is followed by a discussion of some intervening decisions before a 
discussion of the NML (pari passu interpretation) litigation against Argentina.44 
This discussion tracks how the courts construct the legal fiction that sovereign 
debt obligations are enforceable. For the purpose of simplification, the term 
“debt contract” refers to promissory notes and bonds.
A. THE ALLIED LITIGATION
Allied Bank International (Allied) is a US chartered bank based in New York. 
It acted as an agent for a syndicate of thirty-nine creditor banks that had 
advanced credit to Costa Rica in 1979. Under the terms of the indenture on the 
promissory notes, these creditors were to be paid in New York in US dollars every 
43. Allied I, supra note 1; Allied II, supra note 1.
44. NML II, supra note 1.
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six months from July 1, 1978 until July 1983. The Costa Rican banks kept to 
the payment schedule until 1981. In August 1981 the Costa Rican Central Bank 
issued a mandate that prohibited banks from making both principle and interest 
payments on external debt to foreign creditors in foreign currency. Any payments 
had to have prior approval of the Central Bank in consultation with the Ministry 
of Finance as, at the time, Costa Rica was renegotiating its foreign debt. While 
the case was pending in the New York District Court, Costa Rica’s creditors 
agreed to dismiss the case. Costa Rica then signed a refinancing agreement 
with Allied continuing to represent the original creditors. However, Fidelity 
Union Trust (one of the thirty-nine) refused to participate in the restructuring. 
Costa Rica resumed payments to the thirty-eight remaining creditors.
Allied revived the enforcement case on behalf of Fidelity and sued the Costa 
Rican banks in the New York District Court. In its motion for summary judgment, 
Allied sought to accelerate the unpaid payments owed by the three state-owned 
banks. Allied further claimed that the promissory notes were confiscated by 
Costa Rica. In response, the Costa Rican banks defended themselves by mainly45 
asserting sovereign immunity from suit and the act of state doctrine. The district 
court refused to enter summary judgement for Allied and reasoned that a judicial 
determination contrary to the Costa Rican directives could embarrass the US 
government because it was the public, as opposed to the commercial, conduct 
of the Costa Rican government that prevented payment. The district court then 
applied the act of state doctrine to dismiss the motion.46 The court was well 
within established precedent in its reasoning. However, this initial finding was 
challenged in the first instance by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in its amicus 
brief seeking rehearing.
The DOJ made three arguments which would eventually set a precedent 
ensuring that sovereign defaults could give rise to enforceable creditor claims 
in US law. The courts could abstain from intervention only if the confiscation 
of creditor property was within the territorial jurisdiction of the foreign state. 
As per the DOJ’s situs analysis, the contracts were payable in the state of New 
York and in US dollars. Hence, the Costa Rican decrees affected creditor rights 
45. The other defences raised were that the court lacked jurisdiction and the notice was not 
properly served.
46. The district court was following an earlier Supreme Court decision that the act of state 
doctrine was partly to respect the independence of every sovereign state by judicial abstention 
when the acts of foreign states were in issue. The key Supreme Court decisions relied on 
by the courts were Underhill v Hernandez and Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino. See 
Underhill v Hernandez, 168 US 250 (1897); Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino 376 US 
398 (1964) [Sabbatino].
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outside its territory and were thus not protected from judicial abstention under 
the act of state doctrine. This interpretation contravened established precedent 
set in Sabbatino.47 In that case, the US Supreme Court found that the act of 
state doctrine was available where the foreign state had territorial jurisdiction.48 
Relying on its situs analysis, the DOJ moves away from precedent set in Underhill 
and Sabbatino49 to argue “that if any part of the transaction took place within 
the United States, or if the place of performance, enforcement, or collection was 
… located in the United States, the doctrine was unavailable.”50 The DOJ did 
not specify any legal grounds for its proposed departure from established law. 
In effect, to perform its enforcement role the court was expected to go beyond its 
common law, precedent-confined remit. The DOJ was establishing a template for 
enforceability under US law.
Following on from the doctrinal discussion above, the DOJ’s interpretation 
removed a ground for judicial abstention—the act of state defence, an established 
sovereign protection in international law. The DOJ’s interpretation established 
the enforceability of Fidelity’s claim in the US courts and in doing so directed 
judicial attention towards the private law dimensions of the dispute—rather 
than determining the case on the issue of sovereign defences under international 
law. In their now unprecedented private enforcement role, on default, the US 
courts could protect the intangible property claims of US creditors. As will be 
discussed below, this intervention opened up a can worms: The courts do not 
clarify what the contract law basis of a creditor’s private property claims are. 
In a market marked by creditor heterogeneity, the essential indeterminacy of the 
basis of each individual creditor claim was papered over. Furthermore, on default, 
formation and performance are now conflated (as affirmed in the DOJ’s situs 
analysis). One corollary of the DOJ’s argument is that the performance of the 
non-payment terms of the bond by the debtor does not matter. In other words, 
under the DOJ’s interpretation, the good faith actions of the debtor become 
irrelevant to the determination of a contractual dispute. The main implication of 
the DOJ’s interpretation was that default is viewed as a confiscation of creditor 
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid at 421.
49. Ibid.
50. James Thuo Gathii, “The Sanctity of Sovereign Loan Contracts and its Origins in 
Enforcement Litigation” (2006) 38:2 Geo Wash Int’l L Rev 251 at 276.
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property, and this view justifies individual enforcement action in US courts.51 
Further, judicial intervention would reinforce the immutability and inflexibility 
of creditor claims. As will be discussed in more detail later, this template would 
have ramifications on third party non-claimants.
In view of the ongoing payments being made by Costa Rica, on appeal, the 
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal52 on the grounds of another 
established sovereign defence: the principles of comity. The court found that 
Allied was required to recognise the validity of the Costa Rican directives that 
triggered the default.53 The court found that even though the situs of the debt was 
within the United States, the conduct of the Costa Rican government—which 
culminated in the debt restructuring—was consistent with US law and policy.54 
With its finding of consistency, the court was upholding the international 
law principle of comity, and was reinforcing what was an important sovereign 
protection in international law.
Significantly, the court deferred to the consensual debt workout agreed to by 
a majority of Costa Rica’s creditors on the grounds that they would be bound to 
the government’s reorganisation of debt. Following common law precedent55 the 
Second Circuit drew an analogy between the ongoing government reorganisation 
and Chapter 11 corporate bankruptcy. In this context the prohibitions imposed 
by the Costa Rican government became an automatic stay and therefore could 
be recognised as such in the common law. As this reading was akin to a common 
law insolvency, default was not a repudiation, but rather “merely a deferral of 
payments while it attempted in good faith to renegotiate its obligations.”56 Like 
the district court, the Allied I court initially resisted intervention on the grounds 
of precedent and US policy on consensual debt workouts. The Allied I court 
also deferred to market initiative and limited its role in the dispute. Finally, 
it acknowledged the situation the Costa Rican government found itself in and 
the reasons that justified its decision to default. All of this was, however, contrary 
51. In a similar vein, Gathii argues that the Second Circuit’s decision in the Allied case was 
informed by classical legal thought of the “late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the 
period of early capitalism in the United States [where] the judicial response to holdouts has 
been to understand freedom of contract as embodying freely made choices that should not be 
interfered with by either the lenders or borrowers or even the courts” (ibid at 269).
52. Allied I, supra note 1 at 519.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. The court referred to the Supreme Court decision in Canada Southern Railway Co v Gebhard, 
109 US 527 (1883) [Canada Southern]. Here the court held that government bondholders 
would be bound by a debt restructuring undertaken by the government.
56. Allied I, supra note 1 at 522.
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to the arguments set out in the DOJ’s intervention in the Allied I court. Their 
submission asserted both the irrelevance of the wider context in determining the 
suit and the good faith actions of the debtor. Allied I led to another instrumental 
intervention by the DOJ, which filed two amicus briefs in response calling for a 
rehearing and for a reversal on rehearing of Allied I.
Following on from its first intervention, the DOJ sought to demarcate 
the competence of the US courts. They argued that “the Allied I court had 
misconstrued U.S. foreign policy on debt adjustment”57 on three grounds:
First, it argued that the United States leadership and involvement in the cooperative 
rescheduling of debt through the Paris Club and through Federal Assistance under 
the Foreign Assistance Act only applied to and affected sovereign defaults on debt 
borrowed from other sovereign lenders rather than debt borrowed from private 
lenders. As such Allied I was argued to have applied the notion of cooperative debt 
adjustment to debt borrowed on the private market while it was only designed to 
apply to borrowing between sovereigns.58
This argument exceptionalized private debt workouts even though, 
in the background, a majority of Costa Rica’s creditors had already consented to 
participate in the workout and Costa Rica was already servicing the new debt. 
The assertion that the restructuring of private debt was not US policy implicitly 
affirmed the inviolability of individual creditor property on default. This 
affirmation was underpinned by the DOJ’s second reason for setting aside Allied 
I, where they “argued that Allied I misconstrued U.S. support for cooperative 
debt adjustment as a basis to undermine the rights of private creditors to obtain 
effective remedies, including due process safeguards against expropriation of 
their property through enforcement litigation.”59 Finally, it was argued “that 
cooperative debt was just one of several policies of the U.S. government and that 
the Allied I court wrongly presumed that Costa Rica’s unilateral restructuring of 
its debt was excusable as a result.”60
The DOJs arguments decontextualized the dispute, as they were silent 
on extenuating factors—such as the reorganisation of an economy in the face 
of a national economic crisis—that would matter in this private law dispute. 
The intervention obviated the distinction between excusable default and wilful 
57. Gathii, supra note 50 at 279-80.
58. Ibid at 280.
59. Ibid at 284. This intervention ignored the finding in the lead case relied on by the Allied I 
court (i.e., Canada Southern) that recognised the legal validity of both debt restructurings 
consented to by a majority of a sovereign’s creditors and the subsisting due process claims of 
holdout creditors like Fidelity.
60. Ibid.
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repudiation that was accepted in international commercial law. Further, the fact 
that a majority of its creditors consented to a debt workout would not give the 
debtor de jure protection against creditor claims in US law. The focus of the 
resistance by Fidelity and amici to the bankruptcy analogy was to establish the 
legal position that non-payments of sovereign debt would constitute a unilateral 
confiscation of each individual creditor’s property.
The DOJ’s intervention was contrary to the actions of the executive branch 
of the US government that had certified Costa Rica as eligible to receive federal 
assistance, which would not have been forthcoming if the “executive branch 
found that the default constituted an expropriation.”61 In effect, to make the 
enforcement of debt contracts possible in US law, judicial intervention had to go 
beyond accepted precedent. In the process, established common law checks and 
balances on the exercise of judicial discretion were dismantled.
The Allied I decision was also resisted by a campaign led by creditor banks, 
the business press, and organisations such as the National Foreign Trade Council, 
the Rule of Law Committee, and the New York Clearing House.62 They claimed:
Allied I legitimized unilateral repudiation of sovereign loan contracts without any 
remedies for U.S. financial institutions and this lack of creditor protection under 
New York Law (as interpreted by the Second Circuit) made all loans to developing 
countries susceptible to similar repudiation.63
This campaign by investors and other market actors reflected the concerns 
raised by the DOJ. The intervention sought by the parties resisting Allied I did 
not demand the legal validation of the actions of Costa Rica’s creditors—as 
market actors they were consenting to the debt restructuring. A key concern 
raised here by the DOJ and other market actors was the unpredictability of 
whether debtors would default opportunistically in a world where the resolution 
of debt crisis was made easier. In other words, if sovereign debt contracts were not 
actually individually enforceable, accurate predictions about debtor behaviour 
could not be made.
The arguments made on behalf of Fidelity—the lone holdout—the amici, 
and the market as a whole unequivocally affirmed the view that debt contracts are 
enforceable in full under US law. As the DOJ stated in its brief when commenting 
61. Instead the executive response would have been to trigger “a suspension of assistance as well 
as the imposition of economic sanctions” (ibid).
62. The discussion of the US government and New York Clearing House Association briefs is 
found in Gathii, ibid at 285; Christopher R Brown, “Enforcing Sovereign Lending” (1984) 
3:7 Int’l Fin L Rev 5.
63. Gathii, supra note 50 at 285.
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on the debt workout: “[W]hile [private] parties may agree to renegotiate 
conditions of payment, the underlying obligations to pay nevertheless remain 
valid and enforceable.”64 This position was accepted by “[t]en of the members of 
the New York Clearing house who had accepted the restructuring.”65
On rehearing, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal reversed Allied I on the 
grounds set out by Allied and the amici.66 The decision affirmed the view that 
sovereign debt was enforceable and that “except under the most extraordinary 
circumstances, [creditor] rights will be determined in accordance with recognized 
principles of contract law.”67 Finally, the finding in Allied II was that “[t]he 
Costa Rican directives are inconsistent with the law and policy of the United 
States. We refuse, therefore, to hold that the directives excuse the obligations 
of the Costa Rican banks.”68 In other words, the court affirmed the private 
law-nature of disputes of this kind. This is a similar point made by Gathii in his 
analysis when he notes:
Rather than viewing the sovereign debt contracts that Costa Rica had with the 
thirty-nine other creditors as establishing relations within which the interests of 
both sovereign debtors and creditors converge, the court subscribed to an especially 
atomistic and individualistic outlook of their contractual relations.69
In the other similar situations involving bond payments, other courts 
followed Allied II and henceforth the view that debt contracts are enforceable 
was established. In AI Credit Corp v Jamaica,70 the Southern District court of 
New York decided that a holdout creditor was under no obligations to waive 
its commercial rights to enforce payment by adhering to a sovereign debt 
restructuring that it had defected from. This was affirmed in Nat’l Union Fire Ins. 
64. Ibid at 289.
65. Gathii notes: In its brief, Costa Rica explained the alliance between Fidelity and the Clearing 
House banks, who had approached the restructuring differently, in the following manner:
[T]he Clearing House concedes that, as major banks, its members have the burden of 
persuading reluctant or recalcitrant banks, such as Fidelity to desist from a position of adamant 
rejection (citations omitted). However, the Clearing House apparently has concluded that 
devotion to a perceived ideological comradeship of banking requires it to sacrifice common sense and 
the common good to an imagined unqualified right of Fidelity to a judgement.
 Ibid at fn 214 [emphasis in original].
66. Allied II, supra note 1.
67. Ibid at 522.
68. Ibid.
69. Gathii, supra note 50 at 303.
70. 666 F Supp 629, 631-32 (SDNY 1987).
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Co of Pittsburgh, PA v People’s Republic of Congo,71 where the court emphasized 
that the creditors participation in debt restructuring was voluntary and could not 
therefore be unilaterally imposed on creditors. In Commercial Bank of Kuwait v 
Rifidian Bank and Central Bank of Iraq,72 the court extended Allied II to find that 
default occasioned by war, economic sanctions, and the freezing of its assets could 
be viewed as wilful default—thus making it impossible for Iraq to obtain foreign 
currency to repay its debts.73 Elliot Associates v Banco de Nacional74 and Pravin 
Banker v Banco Popular Del Peru75 in both cases the courts held that creditors 
could exclude themselves from debt restructurings and sue for the face value of 
the debt. In decisions that have followed the Allied decisions, the classical mind 
set of the common law courts has been replaced by an interventionist stance with 
variable precedential constraints. The case law analysis in this paper reveals that 
with the gradual dismantling of sovereign protections in US law, courts have 
extended their enforcement role in an attempt to paper over the structural flaws 
inherent in sovereign debt markets.
Allied II also implicitly affirmed that, on default, there is no room for any 
intermediate extenuating circumstances between the formation of the contract 
and its full performance. Further, unlike other contractual contexts, and given 
the nature of these disputes, the judicial role extends beyond the four corners 
of the contract. The courts are not merely enforcing contracts but are in fact 
“exercising the power of the state of New York over the power of a foreign state 
to favour in-state multinationals banking interests.”76 In a similar vein, it has 
been noted that the Allied II court was engaged in “public decisions about what 
agreements to enforce or not to enforce.”77 This understanding is consistent with 
the view developed here that enforcement is more than a judicial intervention. 
Indeed, enforcement becomes a political act.78
In relation to specific contract doctrine, it has been argued that the “courts 
have largely adopted as a rule the sanctity of sovereign debt contracts when 
71. 729 F Supp 936 (SDNY 1989).
72. 15 F (3d) 238 at 242-43 (2nd Cir 1994).
73. Ibid.
74. 194 F (3d) 363 (2nd Cir 1999).
75. 109 F (3d) 850 (2nd Cir 1997).
76. Gathii, supra note 50 at 307.
77. Ibid.
78. For a diametrically opposite outcome, see Russell Jackson v The Peoples Republic of China, 
740 F 2d 1490 (11th Cir 1986). Here, to avoid embarrassing the Chinese government, the 
Secretary of State intervened through the DOJ urging “the court to refrain from deciding the 
case … [he] highlighted China’s ability to retaliate economically against the United States 
should the court proceed to rule against China.” Gathii, ibid at 309.
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confronted with claims brought by holdout creditors.”79 This section discussed 
the Allied cases in order to outline how the recognition of sanctity of contract laid 
the groundwork for courts to play an increasingly expansive role. On the whole, 
it is argued here that enforcement litigation introduces legal indeterminacy and 
uncertainty that will eventually disrupt market-driven consensual debt workouts. 
The following section examines the latest changes in the courts enforcement role 
with an examination of NML v Argentina.80
B. NML V ARGENTINA
In 1994, Argentina began issuing debt securities (“FAA Bonds”) pursuant to 
a Fiscal Agency Agreement. The agreement was governed by New York law. 
A number of individual investors bought bonds that Argentina had started 
issuing in 1998. Argentina defaulted on the bonds in 2001 after its president 
declared a “temporary moratorium” on principal and interest payments on more 
than $80 billion of its external debt—including the FAA bonds.81 A minority of 
investors established exclusively to buy distressed Argentine debt (also known 
as distressed asset investors) acquired beneficial interests in the FAA bonds at 
a deep discount immediately before Argentina defaulted in December 2001 
and at various times from the first issuance until June 2010.82 These distressed 
asset investors included NML, a Cayman Islands hedge fund. Distressed asset 
investors are referred to as holdouts because they refuse to participate in debt 
79. Ibid.
80. NML I, supra note 1; NML II, supra note 1.
81. The Argentine default as with other similar events in the past was a significant event. The 
default was at the end of a “prolonged economic recession.” Paul Blustein, And the Money 
Kept Rolling In (and Out): Wall Street, the IMF and the Bankrupting of Argentina (2006) 
at 193. See also Carmen M Reinhart and Kenneth S Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight 
Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton University Press, 2009). “By the end of 2001, the 
crisis made it impossible for Argentina to service its overwhelming debt burden—some $80 
billion in public external debt—while maintaining basic governmental services necessary for 
the health, welfare and safety of the Argentine populace.” NML II, supra note 1, Petition for 
the Writ of Certiorari filed by the Republic of Argentina in the Supreme Court of the United 
States, at 7 [Argentina Writ].
82. The coupon rates on the FAA bonds ranged from 9.75 per cent to 15 per cent and the dates 
of maturity ranged from April 2005 to September 2031:
NML and similar “vulture” hedge funds seek to take advantage of the absence of bankruptcy 
protection in the sovereign context by bringing lawsuits for the face value of defaulted 
sovereign debt, obtaining judgements on which interest continues to run indefinitely, and 
then using aggressive means to try and execute them.
 Argentina Writ, ibid at 41.
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workouts offered by the debtor, seeking instead to enforce their contracts for full 
repayment. These investors are collectively referred to as ‘holdouts’ as they hold 
out from participating in debt workouts offered by the debtor, seeking instead to 
enforce their contracts for full repayment.
In the absence of a bankruptcy regime for insolvent states, Argentina 
restructured its external debt on a voluntary basis through two global exchange 
offers in 2005 and 2010.83 In the debt settlements, participating holders (called 
Exchange Bondholders) exchanged old, nonperforming debt for new performing 
debt with lower interest rates, a reduced principal, and longer maturities. The 
exchange offers were extended to all holders of eligible debt, including NML. 
Owners of the debt tendered approximately 92 per cent of the aggregate eligible 
debt in the exchange offers, making the Republic’s sovereign debt restructuring 
the largest in history until Greece in 2012. However, NML and other holdouts 
refused to participate in either workout.
These workouts were substantively in accordance with established market 
practice. The only difference was that Argentina wanted to incentivize creditors 
to participate in the debt workouts. To that end it passed the “Lock Law” in 2005, 
which barred the “National Executive Power” from reopening “the swap process 
established in the [2005 workout].”84 In effect Argentina was restricting itself 
from negotiating a deal with the holdouts. It also classified unexchanged FAA 
Bonds as a category separate from its regular debt and claimed that it was not in 
a legal position to pay that category since 2005. As a sovereign state, Argentina 
had decided that it was unwilling to negotiate with the holdouts. This sovereign 
choice notwithstanding, in the US courts it was a defendant in a contractual 
83. Unable to service its debts, Argentina had no choice but to defer interest and principal 
payments to its bondholders. Like many nations that have faced economic crisis and 
unsustainable indebtedness, including the United States in the early days of its constitution, 
Argentina was forced to seek restructuring of both its external and internal public debt. Ibid.
84. NML I, supra note 1 at 6. This complemented the term in the prospectus of the exchange 
offer which stated:  
“Risks of not participating in [the] exchange offer” were the following: Existing defaulted 
bonds eligible for exchange that are not tendered may remain in default indefinitely … 
The Government has announced that it has no intention of resuming payments on any 
bonds eligible to participate in [the] exchange offer … that are not tendered or otherwise 
restructured as part of such transaction. Consequently, if you elect not to tender your bonds 
in any exchange offer there can be no assurance that you will receive any future payments in 
respect of your bonds.
 Since 2005, the year in which Argentina began restructuring its debt, all budget laws include 
a mandate from Congress to the Presidents to restructure the debt until all debt in default is 
fully restructured. Ibid at 7-9.
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dispute and had defaulted on its debt. The 2005 offer closed with a 76 per cent 
participation rate, representing a par value of $62.3 billion. Argentina had, 
by then, also repaid its official debt. The diminished debt overhang had allowed 
the country to grow in line with the expectations of the exchange bondholders.
In 2010, Argentina initiated a second exchange offer with a payment scheme 
substantially identical to the 2005 offer: The prospectus contained a similarly 
worded warning to creditors wishing to holdout,85 and the Lock Law was 
suspended by the executive. Again, following these two workouts, Argentina 
restructured close to 92 per cent of its defaulted external debt. This restructuring 
was in line with market expectations as this outcome was roughly in line with 
debt workouts in the past.86 Outstanding payments to the holdouts principal 
and interest payments on its defaulted debt amounted to $1.33 billion.87 As in 
2005, this default and restructuring were a sovereign act that were interpreted 
very differently when viewed through the lens of a contract law dispute. The 
Lock Law allowed Argentina to treat its exchange bondholders better than the 
holdouts, as the former had guaranteed access to payment streams denied to the 
latter. Argentina countered with the argument that,
… the Passage of the Lock Law … merely prohibits the Executive from unilaterally 
settling defaulted claims or re-opening the exchange offer without Congressional 
approval, therefore did not create “a legal priority to those creditors that entered the 
exchange offer,”… the Law did not create any preferred creditor class.88
This argument would become the defining interpretation of this legislation 
to justify enforcement. The exchange bondholders accepted a significant 
discount on the face value of the FAA bonds in 2005 and 2010, as they relied 
on Argentina’s “willingness and ability to make payments on the Exchange 
85. Existing defaulted bonds eligible for exchange that are not tendered may remain in default 
indefinitely. As of June 30, 2004, Argentina was in default on approximately US $102.6 
billion of its public indebtedness.
The Government has announced that it has no intention of resuming payment on any 
bonds eligible to participate in [the] exchange offer … that are not tendered or otherwise 
restructured as part of such transaction. Consequently, if you elect not to tender your bonds 
in an exchange offer there can be no assurance that you will receive any future payments in 
respect of your bonds.
 Ibid at 7.
86. This practice is roughly in line with debt restructurings in the past.
87. The face amount of their FAA bonds was only $428 million; the lion’s share of $1.33 
billion claimed by Respondents represents interest on interest. Pert No 12-1494 at 11 (S Ct 
June 24, 2013).
88. Gulati & Scott, supra note 2 at 173.
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Bonds.”89 Argentina fully honoured its obligations to the exchange bondholders 
until the second default in 2014.
NML was the lead litigant in the litigation triggered by the 2001 default.90 
The district court issued summary orders against Argentina, but NML had 
limited success in enforcing the judgment. The country had immunized its assets 
from attachment to avoid the restrictive immunity regime that has been in place 
in the US since 1976.91 This immunization became the issue that eventually led 
NML to revive92 an interpretation of the pari passu clause that was used in earlier 
litigation against Peru.93 In 2011, the court accepted the NML interpretation of 
the clause. This was followed by a remedial order issued in 2012.94 NML was now 
joined by numerous other “me too” holdouts, who all sought substantially the 
same relief. In exercise of his equitable jurisdiction, the judge ordered Argentina 
to pay the holdouts in full whenever payments were made to the exchange 
bondholders. The court enjoined any payments to the exchange bondholders 
89. NML II, supra note 1, Exchange Bondholders Group, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (No 
13 - 251993) (Counsel Press, 2014) at 3 [EBG Cert Petition].
90. NML was eventually joined by 11 other holdouts. See NML I, supra note 1 at 3.
91. Carmine D Boccuzzi Jr, Michael M Brennan & Jacob H Johnson “Defences” in Lastra & 
Buchheit, supra note 2 at 106. Here, the authors discuss the issue of sovereign immunity 
restrictions being included in the standard waivers of jurisdictional immunity in the 
debt instruments and outside the contract “under the ‘commercial activity’ exception to 
immunity where the instrument provides for performance—that is payment—in the United 
States” (ibid at 106).
92. The interpretation was first raised by NML in 2004 but was withdrawn after the US DOJ 
and the Clearinghouse filed amicus briefs denying this interpretation. This was however 
before the Lock Law was passed by Argentina in 2005 and Argentina’s continuing refusal to 
pay the holdouts. See NML I, supra note 1.
93. Elliott Associates v Banco de la Nacion, No 2000QR92 (CT App Brussels, 8th Chamber, 
September 26, 2000) [Elliott Associates]. The only instance in which holdout strategies were 
successful in enforcing a debtor’s obligations was in Elliot Associates. The holdouts adopted 
an identical strategy by seeking to interfere with the payment flows to exchange bondholders 
to enforce repayment. The holdouts presented the same construction of the pari passu clause. 
This was upheld in a Brussels appeals court to suspend interest payments that were due on 
Brady bonds. To avoid default Peru settled out of court. The decision to settle was a political 
one. The concern raised at the time was that the availability of this threat gave holdouts the 
remedy of interfering with cross-border payments to exchange bondholders. The concern 
was that holdouts now had a veto over the regularisation of a country’s relations with 
mainstream creditors and hence over its return to international capital markets. See Scott, 
supra note 29 at 6.
94. This was followed by an Order granting permanent injunction on November 21, 2012. The 
court relied on the case Robert Pashaian v Eccelston Properties, Ltd, 88 F (3d) 77 (1996). See 
NML I, supra note 1.
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until such time as Argentina also paid the holdouts “the same fraction of the 
amount due them.”95 At the time of the hearing, the court
…emphasised that (i) there was no legal authority for the requested injunction; (ii) 
it lacked the power to impose an otherwise non-existent condition on the Exchange 
Bondholders’ rights to receive payments by requiring simultaneous payments to [the 
holdouts]; and (iii) the requested injunction would impermissibly interfere with the 
Exchange Bondholders’ property rights.96
The judge repeatedly stated that though “Injunctions have ‘problems’ and 
‘problems on appeal’… compelling [Argentina] to pay Respondents’ private 
contract debt ‘overrid[es]’ Exchange Bondholders’ Rights.”97 Unlike the holdouts 
who specialise in investing in distressed funds, the exchange bondholders98 
comprised a “wide swathe of the investing public, including pension funds, 
charitable foundations, and endowments.”99 Both the pari passu interpretation 
and the injunctive remedy were unprecedented. The structural problem of weak 
enforcement would see a further expansion of the court’s attempt to enforce the 
debtor’s obligations. Further, the court’s powers extend beyond the parties to the 
dispute: They affected the exchange bondholders and institutions in the clearing 
system as a whole. This injunction was affirmed by the Second Circuit.100
Before the District Court made its ruling, contrary decisions were being 
made in other courts.101 An English common law court upheld a ruling rejecting 
the argument “that a pari passu clause entitles creditors to injunctive relief in ‘a 
situation in which third parties are potentially exposed to penal consequences 
which could never be visited upon the defendant to whom the order is actually 
directed.’”102 It was also argued that,
[t]he effect on third parties also undermines the equitable basis of the injunction 
… [it] is designed to hold exchange bondholders and payment intermediaries 
95. NML I, ibid at 5.
96. EBG Cert Petition, supra note 89 at 8. This was the position also taken by NML’s 
counsel who “admitted that the Injunctions would engraft a ‘condition’ on the Exchange 
bondholders’ ability to enjoy their own property that otherwise does not exist” 
(ibid at 9, n 6).
97. Ibid at 9, n 9.
98. A subset formed the group that filed the writ petition. On the whole the “outstanding 
amounts owed to Exchange Bondholders totals over $24 Billion, over $1 Billion of which 
will be owed to [Exchange Bondholder] members.” Ibid at 3.
99. Ibid.
100. NML II, supra note 1.
101. A German court also declined to grant the holdouts relief. See ibid at 9, n 11.
102. Ibid, citing Kensington International Limited v Republic of the Congo, [2003] EWCA 2331 
(Comm) [Kensington].
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hostage—in effect to force Argentina to inflict the broadest possible harm (and thus 
to incur the greatest reputational cost) if it insists on refusing to pay holdouts. … 
why should investor A obtain relief that works by inflicting collateral damage on 
non-party investor B and on assorted non-pay financial intermediaries?103
What the courts overlooked in their dismissal of the Exchange Bondholders’104 
arguments about exceeding its powers was that NML actually “wanted as its 
remedy … a kind of inter-creditor obligation.”105 This raised a substantive issue 
rather than a remedial issue about the legality of the injunction. As in the case 
of a default, an interference with the payment stream by the injunction would 
constitute a taking of creditor property. The Exchange Bondholders argued in 
their cert petition that their “contract rights and the funds they are entitled 
to receive pursuant thereto constitute ‘property’ within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment, which ‘is addressed to every sort of [property] interest the 
citizen may possess.’”106 However unlike default, the court, not the debtor, was 
implicated in the taking. To make this point, they argued that their “fundamental 
constitutional rights protecting them from government action that seizes their 
property for the benefit of other private citizens” were being breached.107 Thus 
in such a situation “[r]eview is necessary to protect the sanctity of private 
property ownership and resultant limitations imposed upon judicial power by 
the Constitution.”108 The Second Circuit dismissed their concerns and found 
103. Weidemaier, supra note 11 at 145.
104. The Exchange bondholder group was a subgroup of exchange bondholders who 
unsuccessfully attempted to intervene in the Court of Appeal in NML’s suit.
105. See Gulati & Scott, supra note 2 at 175; see also Declaration of Stephen Choi, NML I, 
supra note 1 [Choi]. There, it was brought to the notice of the court that “[n]onpayment 
would have an immediate and irreversible negative impact on the Exchange bondholders.” 
Regarding the substantive effect of the injunction, the court was informed that its 
“injunction takes two separate obligations (the obligation to pay the exchange bondholders 
and the obligation to pay NML Capital and the other holdouts) and makes satisfaction of 
one obligation (payment to NML Capital and the other holdouts) a precondition to satisfy 
the other obligation (payment to the Exchange bondholders).” Choi also stated that the 
injunction is different from more traditional means of enforcement in that it imposes a 
material increase in the risk of non-payment on another class of bondholders, the Exchange 
Bondholders, as the means to obtain payment for another class of bondholders, NML 
Capital and other holdouts. See Choi, ibid, at paras 7, 13, 14.
106. EBG Cert Petition, supra note 89 at 25, n 17 citing United States v General Motors 
Corporation, 323 US 373 (1945).
107. Ibid at 16.
108. Ibid at 25.
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in a footnote that “the … injunctions do not deprive Exchange Bondholders of 
any property.”109
The court also stated that “the [Exchange Bondholders] can also sue 
[Argentina] if the injunctions lead to default.”110 This suit was not possible for 
several reasons. For one, as the Exchange Bondholders stated, “[i]f [Argentina] is 
forced into default … then the court will have already caused grave losses to the 
Exchange Bondholders.”111 In a declaration made to the District Court on behalf 
of the Exchange Bondholders, Stephen Choi stated why this loss would occur: 
The injunction would, he declared “materially increase the risk of non-payment 
for the Exchange Bondholders.”112 The injunction, he further argued, would 
have an “irreversible and negative impact” in addition to not receiving interest 
and principal payments. He also stated that “[n]on-payment will also result in a 
likely large decline in the price of the Exchange bonds … making it difficult if 
not impossible for Exchange bondholders to exit their positions through sales to 
other investors.”113 Choi’s assessment was based on his examination of “several 
market metrics for the Exchange bonds [which] indicate a significantly increased 
risk of default following the Second Circuit’s NML Capital Opinion.”114 Choi 
highlights the complexity mentioned above that makes such enforcement 
impossible without affecting third party claims. Though Argentina did eventually 
default as the injunctions blocked payments to the exchange bondholders, Choi 
had argued earlier that Exchange Bondholders had no option but to wait for 
the resolution of the dispute or sue the debtor to enforce their contracts.115 
Suing for enforcement was not problem-free, as this would come up against the 
structural flaw of weak enforcement. The EBG thus argued that “suit against the 
Republic would be futile; any judgment would go unsatisfied as demonstrated by 
[holdouts’] failure to collect monetary judgements against [Argentina] to date.”116
The order also prohibited agents and other participants in the clearing system 
through which payments were made from “aiding and abetting Argentina’s 
109. NML II, supra note 1 at 14, n 10.
110. Ibid.
111. EBG Cert Petition, supra note 89 at 29, n 22.
112. Choi, supra note 105 at para 7.
113. Ibid.
114. Choi, supra note 105 at para 18.
115. To limit their financial losses they could follow Elliot, the parent company of NML Capital, 
and make a bet on default [by acquiring] “approximately $100 million of credit default 
swaps that pay off only if Argentina defaults on its obligations to the Exchange bondholders” 
(ibid at para 18).
116. EBG Cert Petition, supra note 89 at 29, n 22.
(2017) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL444
violation of the court’s order.”117 Under the indentures of the Exchange bonds 
issued in the two workouts, Argentina made principal and interest payments 
to a trustee in Argentina who, in turn, made an electronic funds transfer (EFT) 
to US-registered Exchange Bondholders. The EFTs are made from the trustee’s 
non-US bank to the registered holders’ US bank, often routed through one 
or more intermediary banks. The court stated that the “Trustee is a fiduciary 
of the Exchange Bondholders, and not an agent of [Argentina].”118 Hence, 
“[o]nce money has been transferred to the Trustee, it is the property of the 
Exchange Bondholders ‘and [Argentina] shall have no interest whatsoever in 
such amounts.’”119 As discussed above, this statement indicates the nature of the 
underlying substantive property claims in the bond contract: Once the contract 
is formed, the substantive property claim covers all monies actually transferred. 
In addition to the exchange bondholders, the injunction would cover third 
party intermediaries including the Bank of New York Mellon (the trustee for the 
exchange bondholders), the registered owners of the exchange bonds, and relevant 
clearing systems such as the Depository Trust Company and Euroclear. The EFTs 
made from a non-US bank are immunized from attachment by US courts as the 
bank is located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the US under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.120 However, the court did not discuss “the 
[Exchange Bondholders’] arguments that the Injunctions impermissibly harm 
innocent third parties and violate the EBG’s Fifth Amendment rights.”121
Argentina then filed a Writ petition in the US Supreme Court in February 
2014 to present two questions. The first was on the issue of the pari passu 
interpretation; the second asked whether the district court has jurisdiction 
to “coerce a foreign sovereign into paying money damages, without regard to 
whether payment would be made with assets that the FSIA makes immune 
from “attachment, arrest and execution.”122 Several amici filed briefs in support 
117. NML II, supra note 1 at 255.
118. Ibid at 4.
119. Ibid.
120. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, USC § 6604 (1976). This act contains the sole, 
comprehensive scheme for obtaining and enforcing a judgement against foreign states in 
US Courts. See also Argentine Republic v Amaerade Hess Shipping Corp, 488 US 428 (1989); 
Af-Cap Inc v Republic of Congo, 462 F (3d) 417 (5th Cir 2006). FSIA “prescribes…[the] 
circumstances under which attachment and execution may be obtained against the property 
of foreign states to satisfy a judgement.”. Its enactment in 1976 codified a partial lowering 
of the absolute immunity from suit and execution previously granted to foreign states at 
common law as a “a matter of grace and comity.”
121. EBG Cert Petition, supra note 89 at 12.
122. Argentina Writ, supra note 81 at 25.
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of Argentina’s petition, including Joseph Stiglitz, Fintech Advisory Inc (an 
Exchange Bondholder), Mexico, and Brazil. This petition was dismissed on June 
24, 2014. The EBG also filed a supporting petition in their capacity as “innocent 
non-party bondholders” who had suffered injuries “as a result of the injunctions 
issued and affirmed by the courts below.” On appeal to the US Supreme Court, 
the Exchange Bondholders123 raised this extension of powers as one of the central 
grounds on which to grant their writ petition. They argued:
[T]his case presents the important and unsettled question of whether a federal court 
has the power to enter an injunction that intentionally takes and uses the private 
property of unoffending non-parties to a contract dispute as leverage to coerce 
payment of an otherwise uncollectable money judgement for the sole benefit of 
private litigants.124
They also argued that “it is not the Republic, but the district court that 
is taking non-parties hostage”125 and that to do so was contrary to established 
precedent which:
[D]id not address or purport to impact non-party interests in any way. It was the 
defendant that threatened to harm non-parties if the injunction was granted. In 
contrast … No harm was threatened to the EBG until the district court crafted 
unprecedented Injunctions that explicitly targeted their property … as leverage 
against the Republic attempting to circumvent the FSIA.126
The holdouts’ appeal to the court’s equitable jurisdiction followed years of 
unsuccessful attempts by the holdouts to enforce money judgements against 
Argentina. This appeal was part of a legal strategy that consciously avoided 
“securing a money judgement in an effort to portray unexceptional claims for 
contract damages as claims for equitable relief.”127 However, the court did not 
have to exercise its equitable powers. The EBG cited precedent on this point that 
found “[A] court may have jurisdiction over an action against a foreign state and 
yet be unable to enforce its judgement” and plaintiffs in such cases “must rely on 
the government’s diplomatic efforts, or a foreign sovereign’s generosity to satisfy 
123. NML I, supra note 1 at 9.
124. EBG Cert Petition, supra note 89 at 16.
125. Ibid at 23.
126. Ibid at 24.
127. Ibid at 19.
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its judgement.”128 Their arguments were dismissed in NML I.129 Further, these 
petitions were ultimately dismissed by the US Supreme Court on June 24, 2014. 
In the face of the injunction Argentina defaulted on its payments to the exchange 
bondholders. This triggered a second default on July 30, 2014.
These lower court decisions are cited by Argentina’s writ of certiorari as raising 
policy implications “of immense importance to all sovereigns, their creditors, 
and the international financial markets.”130 One implication is that the court 
can grant “by injunction an enforcement remedy that it cannot provide by an 
execution device, because to do so would render [sovereign] property immunities 
a nullity.”131 Another is that this innovation “permit[s] US courts to use their 
coercive powers to restrain sovereign property located outside the United States.” 
By extension, this innovation represents “an unprecedented intrusion into 
the activities of a foreign state within its own territory that raises significant 
foreign relations concerns for the United States.” Argentina claimed that an 
extraterritorial order that aims “to dictate the disposition of a foreign state’s assets 
contravenes established precedent on comity.”132 The courts also overlooked the 
self-help remedies specified in the bond contract such as acceleration.
Eventually, the injunction was lifted on two conditions: (1) Argentina would 
make full payment to the holdouts in full satisfaction of their claims and (2) repeal 
all the legislation that prevented the state from repaying them. A court order in 
a private law dispute thus repealed legislation passed by a sovereign within its 
own territory, though the resolution of the issue was eventually achieved through 
128. Ibid at 19, citing FG Hemisphere v Democratic Republic of Congo, 637 F (3d) 
373 (DC Cir 2011).
129. The Second Circuit found that “the FAA does not contain a clause limiting the remedies 
available for a breach of agreement. Nor does it contain a provision precluding specific 
performance or injunctive relief.” Once the SDNY had established a breach of contract 
and the grounds for injunctive relief, it found that the “court had considerable latitude in 
fashioning the relief.” This would be true even in situations where the performance required 
by a decree goes beyond that promised in the contract. See NML I, supra note 1 at 23. 
In situations “where ‘the most desirable solution’ is not possible, this Court may affirm an 
order of specific performance so long as it achieves a ‘fair result’ under the ‘totality of the 
circumstances.’” See NML II, supra note 1 citing Leasco Corporation v Taussig, 473 F (2d) 
777 (2d Cir 1972). The Court found that monetary damages were not an effective remedy 
for the ‘harm’ NML had suffered as a result of the breach. The finding was justified by the 
evidence that Argentina would simply refuse to pay any judgments. The court further found 
that “Even if damages are adequate in other respects, they will be inadequate if they cannot 
be collected by judgment and execution.” See NML I, supra note 1 at 24.
130. Argentina Writ, supra note 81 at 2.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid at 4.
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political change. While the new government in Argentina was more amenable to 
repaying the holdouts, in the main this resolution was driven by its need to regain 
access primary capital markets—which it eventually did.
Another key concern raised in this litigation was the practical effect of 
enabling “a single creditor to thwart the implementation of an internationally 
structured restructuring plan.”133 This concern was raised in the US government’s 
amicus brief supporting Argentina (unlike the Allied cases, in which the DOJ 
supported the holdout claim).134 In response, the court made two moves in 
exercising its significantly expanded enforcement role. First, it secured the 
holdouts’ enjoyment of their bonds irrespective of the risks they took in buying 
sovereign debt. Second, the court secured the holdouts’ freedom to use their 
bonds for their own enjoyment irrespective of the consequence of this enjoyment 
for others. These are the two key incidents of sovereign debt in its commodity 
form, as they evolved as an unintended consequence of enforcement litigation. 
These incidents are discussed in more detail in Part II.
II. SOVEREIGN DEBT AS A COMMODITY
Following from the discussion in Part I, sovereign default justifies enforcement 
action to compensate creditors for the harm caused to them—though it is not 
clear how the creditors are harmed. The consistent position taken in the Allied 
cases by the official sector amici, the market, and the courts was that there was 
damage to creditor’s property. But the legal nature of this property and how it 
arises is unclear. What is clear is that the basis of the harm caused to the creditors 
was a contractual breach by the debtor. What is also clear is that the sovereign 
would be held to the payment promise it made to the harmed creditors. This 
section fills the conceptual gaps from a contract law perspective and, in doing so, 
reveals the commodity form that debt takes as an unintended consequence of the 
courts’ expanded enforcement role. The implications of this commodity form are 
also discussed in this section.
133. NML II, supra note 1, Joseph Stiglitz Amicus Brief in Support of Petitioner dated 24 March 
2014 in petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 7 [Stiglitz].
134. The court confined the impact of their decisions to Argentina on the grounds of the 
widespread adoption of “Collective Action Clauses” which will “effectively eliminate the 
possibility of ‘holdout’ litigation.” The effectiveness of these clauses was raised but dismissed. 
This has since been raised by the government of Mexico in its amicus brief. EBG Cert 
Petition, supra note 8 at 18a, paras 25-26.
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A. A CONTRACT LAW PERSPECTIVE
1. ASSUMPTIONS
This section begins with a few simplifying assumptions. First, for the purposes of 
developing this perspective, sovereign debt contracts are assumed to be a sui generis 
category of contracts.135 This assumption partly accounts for the uniqueness of 
the sovereign debt market as a contracting environment.136 It also partly accounts 
for uniqueness of the bond contract itself.137 Second, sovereign bond contracts 
are assumed to be voluntary138 transactions and as such are distinct from tort 
and unjust enrichment claims. This voluntariness is also assumed to be the basis 
of the obligations of both the sovereign and its creditors. It follows then that 
“the contractual rights and duties between the parties are completely specified 
and determined at formation”139—that is, when the bonds are purchased.140 
It also follows that,
135. This is a simplifying assumption—sovereign bond contracts do not fall into the categories 
of contracts normally thought to be within the domain of contract law. This assumption 
is necessary as there is currently no theory of sovereign debt contracts requires a theory 
of sovereign debt contracts and is beyond the scope of this paper. Such a theory would, 
for instance, specify the different necessary and sufficient foundations of a debtor’s legal 
obligations. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E Scott, “Contract Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law” (2003) 4:113 Yale LJ 541.
136. This uniqueness is attributed to two features by Gulati and Scott. “On the one hand, 
given their official status these bonds are often considered to be the most risk-free of any 
securities… On the other hand, sovereign bonds are, in one sense, amongst the riskiest of 
investments: Because of their sovereign status, governments can default with impunity.” See 
Gulati & Scott, supra note 2 at 53.
137. Ibid.
138. This is a contested premise as it avoids questions about the differing conceptual basis of 
consent and necessity especially in post-default situations where arguably sovereigns have 
no option but to refinance their obligations and creditors have no option but to accept the 
debtor’s offer. Here an attempt is made to address what Peter Benson has called a “unified 
and coherent moral basis for contract.” See Peter Benson, “Contract as a Transfer of 
Ownership” (2007) 48:5 Wm & Mary L Rev 1673 at 1673.
139. Ibid at 1674.
140. In cases where a sovereign issues debt for the first time, the sovereign and the lead 
underwriter negotiate over the deal documents and the debt is then sold to the clients of 
the underwriter. In cases where debt has recently been issued, the deal documents used to 
issue this debt would be used as templates. These are boilerplate contracts and “[a] sovereign 
that is new to the markets has an incentive to use the standard provisions as far as possible.” 
In situations where new debt is issued as part of a restructuring, the sovereign debtor often 
makes “a unilateral offer to the existing creditors” which they accept if the debt workout 
settles. In both situations, it is assumed that the contract between the sovereign and its 
creditors is formed when the debt is purchased. See Gulati & Scott, supra note 2 at 29.
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The character and the shape of these rights is reflected in the fact that they are 
specified only as between the parties, not against others who are strangers to the 
contract and that their breach is remedied through damages or specific performance, 
both of which aim to put the plaintiff [creditor] in the position he or she would have 
been in had the defendant [debtor] performed as promised.141
Third, it is assumed that the breach of the sovereign debtor’s promise and 
the harm caused to the creditor are juridically significant for the purposes of 
enforcement. Fourth, the creditor has ownership and property rights. The 
distinction between the two rights will become clearer as the discussion proceeds. 
Fifth, it is assumed that contract “law supposes that these remedies are necessary 
and sufficient to enforce by way of compensation, the rights and duties that are 
brought into existence by the parties’ consent at contract formation.”142 Finally, 
it is assumed that this commodity form is unique, having developed as judges 
respond to debtor intransigence and thus negotiate the structural flaws in the 
international debt market as explained above.
This section relies on Peter’s Benson’s article “Contract as a Transfer of 
Ownership”143 to clarify the nature of debt as a commodity as an unintended 
consequence of enforcement in the circumstances described. There are two main 
reasons why Benson provides a good starting point for this discussion. First, 
he establishes promises as the source of ownership rights in contract law. This 
proposition is consistent with the view of the court in the enforcement decisions. 
Second, Benson makes a distinction between contract as a transfer of ownership 
(his view) and contract as a transfer of property (Kant’s view). The significance of 
this distinction will become clearer during the course of this discussion.
2.  STYLIZED EXPLANATION
Based on the assumptions made above, this section develops a stylized description 
of the consequences of the enforcement litigation. On the formation144 of a 
contract between D (a debtor) and C (a creditor), D promises to (re)pay C a 
defined sum of money. In addition to this promise, C acquires ownership rights 
141. Benson, supra note 138 at 1674.
142. Ibid.
143. For the purposes of this paper we are not concerned with Benson’s examination of the 
expectation interest as the basis of compensation in contract law.
144. This is consistent with Benson’s analysis, as when he states that “the legal principles governing 
the requisite assents—the doctrine of offer and acceptance as well as consideration—do 
not single out enforceable promises on the basis of their substantive content, purposes or 
economic significance. [Thus when it comes to enforcement] the principles of formation are 
content-neutral and indifferent to such considerations.” See Benson, supra note 138 at 1677.
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that are transferred through mutual assents at the time of formation.145 A key 
element in the subsequent enforceability of this contract is C’s acquisition of a 
proprietary interest in some thing that is yet unclear. As noted, the acquisition of a 
property claim by C from D is central to the judicial justification for enforcement.
If D fails to pay (and thereby does not fulfil his or her promise to pay C) 
then a court will enforce the contract on the grounds that C’s proprietary right 
has been damaged. Enforcement is necessary to protect C by compensating him 
for the damage caused to his or her property. The question that arises here is: 
How does C obtain a legally protected interest? Further, does this interest include 
non-proprietary ownership rights to acquire, retain, and alienate the debt? The 
courts in the cases examined above answered this question by assuming that the 
debt contract itself is the source of C’s rights.146 Thus on formation, it is assumed 
here that the source of C’s rights is D’s promise to pay.147 This focus on D’s promise 
as the basis of C’s rights is consistent with promissory theories of contract.148 Yet 
D’s promise is one of many different ways to explain the source of C’s rights.149 
This promissory view is not immutable or fixed a priori, but is a function of 
the context in which the Allied cases were decided: The debt market was in 
transition, and attempts were being made to secure the banking system in the 
145. According to Benson, the ownership rights recognize the thing transferred to be “physically 
separate from individuals and also must be acquirable by individuals acting unilaterally that 
is, without the actual consent or participation of others. The idea of social cooperation plays 
no role here whatsoever.” The ownership claim is individually enforceable and does not factor 
in any “social cooperation.” See ibid at 1699.
146. Ibid at 1677.
147. In defence of this view Benson states “[a] promise of something in return for another’s 
refraining from an activity he or she is legally permitted to do, as in the famous case of 
Hamer v. Sidway has the same legal standing and significance as the most sophisticated and 
commercially important business deal.” Ibid at 1678.
148. There are different promissory theories of contract law. Benson defends a promissory theory 
of enforcement to counter an alternative reliance theory discussed in Fuller and Purdue. See 
L L Fuller & William R Perdue, Jr, “The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1” (1936) 
46:1 Yale LJ 52 [“Contract Damages 1”]; L L Fuller & William R Perdue Jr, “The Reliance 
Interest in Contract Damages: 2” (1937) 46:3 Yale LJ 373.
149. A very different justification for enforcement would be to follow a view in which “property 
and promises” are radically distinguished. Here “[p]roperty, but not promise, expresses a 
right of ownership in the large sense of having something of one’s own from which one is 
entitled by rights to exclude others” (italics omitted). The justification for enforcement that 
follows from this view is that “certain promises should be enforced … not because they 
are understood as conferring ownership or creating a relation of exclusive right as between 
the parties but simple and solely because enforcement is desirable on the basis of policy 
considerations.” Benson, supra note 138 at 1679 [italics omitted].
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US through several interventions such as the Baker and the Brady Plans.150 The 
debt market was securitized, loan agreements were being replaced by bonds, and 
heterogeneous private creditors—mainly non-bank commercial institutions—
were replacing banks. The risks of lending to sovereigns in this context were shifted 
onto private investors, reducing the systemic threat to the US banking system. 
The judicial intervention in Allied can therefore be seen as an attempt to enhance 
creditor protection by recognising that the sovereign promise to pay is creditor 
property. On default, this recognition would, in theory, ensure enforcement. This 
understanding was a legal fiction. Given weak enforcement, the task of finding 
sovereign assets to satisfy creditors’ claims is next to impossible.
 In a typical debt issuance, the debt contract is purchased and the debtor 
fulfils a promise to pay by making regular payments of principal and interest 
owed over the life of the bond until redemption. One way to explain why the 
promise is significant is to view C as deferring the consumption of resources 
today to a point in the future at which the debt is repaid. Thus C is giving 
up a beneficial opportunity that he or she “would take but for the promise.”151 
Therefore if D defaults, C will not be able to go back to his or her pre-contractual 
position, as that opportunity may no longer be available.152 Thus the basis for 
compensation is an injury (a loss of an opportunity) to C that comes under his 
or her exclusive right against D. It is this need for exclusivity that raises the issue 
of “whether there can be such entitlements at the moment of contract formation 
and therefore fully established solely through the parties expressions of mutual 
assent.”153 Given the transactional context of the enforcement decisions, the 
focus of the rulings was clearly to recognise and protect C’s entitlements obtained 
exclusively from D (and which D must eventually compensate C for) rather than 
other creditors or any other third party.
Following from the discussion above, it is clear that the NML court imposed 
a constraint on the entitlements of exchange bondholders, not on D as should 
150. The Baker and Brady Plans were rolled out in 1985 and 1989 respectively. The Plans 
were attempts to limit the impact of expected debt defaults across Latin America on the 
US banking system. The successful Brady Plan was premised on the securitization of US 
commercial bank loans to Latin American sovereigns leading to the eventual development of 
modern sovereign bond markets.
151. Ibid at 1679.
152. This is Benson’s argument against the “reliance interest” as the basis for compensation. 
He argues that “the reliance remedy cannot itself count as compensatory unless it repairs 
injury to something which comes under the promisee’s exclusive right as against the 
promisor” (ibid).
153. It is the search for such entitlements that raise the issue of property claims that underpin the 
justification for enforcement in the promissory theory.
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have happened. In response to debtor intransigence, the court contravened 
the contract law analysis set out above. The decisions were not supported by 
precedent. However, they were affirmed repeatedly, while the contracts were 
enforced and the holdouts were paid in full. The implication is that there exists no 
immutable, a priori common law template for enforcement. While it is possible 
to argue, for instance, that there are sound policy reasons for enforcement, such 
as an intransigent debtor and the lack of attachable assets,154 the precedential 
constraints on the court were removed so the courts rely on policy arguments 
to justify their decisions. As described above, this outcome reflects the context 
in which the court is making the decision: The sovereign immunity analysis in 
the EBG petition reveals that the court had no choice but to take this route 
because any attempt to attach D’s property would be extra jurisdictional and 
contravene sovereign immunity restrictions.155 Therefore, from the contract law 
perspective developed here, there is no common law justification156 for the judicial 
intervention in the NML litigation. Nevertheless, the decision is still binding. 
This outcome indicates the legal indeterminacy that marks judicial interventions 
in contract disputes in general: There is no one template for enforcement. The 
discussion here is not meant to justify a contractual argument or to counter 
the courts’ decisions but to highlight: the creation of a legal fiction that debt 
is a commodity.
This development leaves open the question of how this fiction was 
engendered in contract law? An answer requires an examination of the basis on 
which C obtains an exclusive entitlement from D. This is where contract law 
intersects property claims. In the decisions discussed above, the courts and amici 
claimed consistently that D’s action contravened C’s due process rights. One way 
to understand this claim in contract law is as follows: On default D breaches the 
contract and thereby interferes with C’s protected interest or entitlement. This 
interpretation presumes a prior view of the contract itself. In a manner consistent 
with the decisions discussed above, it is assumed that at one level the courts viewed 
the contract as a transfer of ownership. The object transferred “is a corporeal 
object” that is physically separate from both C and D and must be acquired 
by them “acting unilaterally, that is, without the actual consent or participation 
154. As mentioned above, Fuller and Purdue offer a reliance based justification for enforcement 
which is distinct from the promissory account discussed here. See “Contract Damages 1,” 
supra note 146.
155. Weidemaier, supra note 11 at 149.
156. As the English courts found in Kensington, supra note 102.
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of others. The idea of social cooperation plays no role here whatsoever.”157 This 
transfer happens on formation of the contract between D and C.
One candidate for the corporeal object independent from both C and D is 
the bond certificate.158 Once the bonds are purchased, D issues C with a bond 
certificate as proof of this transfer. However, this explanation—without more—
does not clarify the significance of D’s promise in defining C’s entitlements, 
as discussed in the preceding paragraph. The bond certificate is a symbol of C’s 
ownership and a necessary incident of ownership as it signals to third parties 
that C owns, and thereby controls, the bonds. C can appropriate the bonds 
(i.e., take possession), can use them in any way he thinks fit, and can alienate them 
when he wishes. Once C’s ownership rights have been established, on breach 
they provide justifications for enforcement—the courts must enforce contracts 
to protect C’s ownership to acquire, use, and alienate his or her debt. As Benson 
notes, in the “contract as transfer of ownership view … [t]he only thing that the 
right ensures is that no one else can rightfully appropriate, use, or alienate the 
owner’s object without his or her consent.”159 According to him, “the right of 
ownership is defined simply as an abstract right to exclude others from treating 
it as their own.”160
Benson’s description is premised on a distinction between a transfer of a 
physical thing and the agreement itself. In the case of a bond contract, does 
the agreement itself signal the incidents of ownership?161 Does D then transfer 
something more than the debt instrument to C? One way to answer these 
questions is to draw a distinction between formation—the agreement between 
C and D—and the actual physical delivery of the debt instrument. It is the 
agreement that produces what Benson refers to as the juridical effect of ownership 
on the physical transfer of the debt instrument. He states that “[m]utual assent 
[between C and D] is the regulative normative idea. It is signalled through the 
physical acts of transfer.”162 It follows then that the physical instrument itself 
has no intrinsic significance, but the agreement that necessarily precedes the 
physical delivery of the thing does. According to Benson, once “the requisite 
assents exist, the question of contractual rights and duties is answered. There 
157. Benson supra note 138 at 1699.
158. “A printed document certifying a debt owed. A bond certificate typically includes the issuer’s 
name, the face value, interest rate, interest payment schedule.” Investor Guide, “Bond 
Certificate,” online: <http://www.investorguide.com/definition/bond-certificate.html>.
159. Supra note 137 at 1702.
160. Ibid at 1703.
161. Ibid at 1726.
162. Ibid at 1705.
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is no further issue as to why the promisor must perform as promised.”163 
It follows then that D’s breach is an interference with the interest C acquired 
when the contract was formed. This answer is only a partial explanation and 
does not capture the uniqueness of the debt dispute, which involves intangible 
property. The Allied court unequivocally viewed D’s default as a taking of C’s 
property. Benson’s account of contract as a transfer of ownership explains that a 
breach is significant because it damages C’s ownership rights. In his view there 
is no property transferred—just ownership rights. This understanding is true of 
sovereign bond creditors, who enjoy ownership rights during the lifetime of the 
bond. On default these ownership rights are lost and C is harmed, but in the 
context of weak enforcement the harm caused to C is perceived to be more than 
just the loss of ownership rights: There is damage to his or her proprietary rights. 
This raises further questions. At what point, and how, does C obtain ownership 
of this property? This proprietary interest must be explained independently of 
physical delivery.
Benson makes a distinction between ownership and property: “Ownership 
is a more general conception consisting of any right to exclusive possession, use, 
or alienation of something as against another or others. Property is a particular 
instance of ownership and more precisely a specific form of acquisition”164 
Benson further distinguishes between contractual rights as ownership rights and 
contractual rights as property rights. He confines the latter to instances where 
the rights are “acquired by a unilateral act of will that requires initial physical 
occupancy of an external corporeal object, contract rights on other hand are 
acquired through the mutually related acts of two parties without the necessity 
of physical occupancy.”165 This explanation of ownership on its own does not 
capture the intangibility of debt obligations as there is no “unilateral act of will 
that requires initial physical occupancy.”166 Hence this view of ownership is only 
a partial explanation as far as intangible obligations are concerned.
In response to the question, “what exactly is the object C acquires by 
contract?”, Benson provides two answers: (1) contract as a transfer of ownership 
and (2) the Kantian view of contract as a transfer of property. Both are examined 
here, though it is clear that the second view is consistent with the enforcement 
decisions discussed in Part I. This explanation also forms the basis of an account 
163. Ibid at 1707.
164. Ibid at 1719 [emphasis in original].
165. Ibid. See also ibid at 1966. In Benson’s explanation, physical occupancy refers to one who 
exercises control over a corporeal thing in private law doctrine.
166. Ibid at 1719.
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of how sovereign debt acquires its commodity form in the law. In his discussion 
of the Kantian approach, Benson notes “the other party’s performance or 
promise, not the thing promised, is the substance and object of the ownership 
that is acquired by a contract.”167 Using the example of the sale of a horse, Kant 
argues as follows,
the object that I acquire by the contract is not at all the horse. My contract right is 
not with respect to the horse. The horse comes under my right of ownership only 
upon delivery, and then it becomes the object of my property right. At contract 
formation, and therefore prior to delivery, all that I have acquired is the other’s deed 
by which that thing [that is the horse] is brought under my control so that I make 
it mine. Kant expresses this idea by saying that what a party acquires at contract 
formation is not the thing promised but the promise itself.168
Benson is critical of this formulation on the ground that in this view 
“the relation of rights between the contracting parties is one thing at contract 
formation and something different upon performance.”169 He further highlights 
the discrepancy between the promisee’s position at formation and the rights 
acquired by the promisee on delivery of the thing transferred.170 The focus of 
Benson’s discussion is on actual physical transfers of things and services, rather 
than transfers of intangible debt obligations. This criticism does not apply to 
the sovereign debt market, given the nature of the transactions and how debt 
obligations are transferred. He partially agrees with Kant’s view that “that the 
object transferred is the promise and not the thing promised [and that this] 
necessarily implies a change of ownership with respect to the thing as between the 
parties at formation.”171 However, unlike Kant, he recognises the ownership right 
as “a non-proprietary right of ownership that is wholly transactional as between 
the parties alone.”172 This view is, however, inconsistent with the approach 
taken by the courts.
167. Ibid at 1720.
168. Ibid citing Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), reprinted in Mary J Gregor ed, 
Practical Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 424 [emphasis added].
169. Ibid.
170. Benson, supra note 138 at 1720. Benson argues that the Kantian approach leads to a 
situation in which the promise’s right to performance can only be understood as a personal 
right against the promisor. If a third party unintentionally damages the thing promised after 
the contract has been entered into, but before performance has taken place, the promisor, 
not the promise, has standing to sue for the damage. The promisee can make such a claim 
only after he or she has taken possession of the thing via delivery. At this point, the promise 
acquires title and has the same right with respect to the thing as did the promisor (ibid).
171. Ibid at 1722.
172. Ibid at 1723 [emphasis omitted].
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B. DISCUSSION
As discussed in the section above, the judicial decisions implicitly conflate what are 
otherwise two conceptually distinct aspects in Benson’s formulation of “contracts 
as transfer of ownership”—that is, formation and performance. In the context of 
sovereign debt, the object that is transferred on formation is D’s promise to pay. 
This transfer ensures that the promise to pay is now within the actual control of 
C. In other words, the decision about whether or not to pay (for instance to avoid 
a national emergency) is no longer within the authority and competence of D 
but has been transferred to C on formation of the contract and comes under his 
or her authority. This conflation of formation and performance obviates contract 
terms such as the self-help remedies specified in the debt contract. In the Allied 
cases, there was limited discussion of contract terms. In NML, on the other hand, 
debtor intransigence made the interpretation of the pari passu clause the central 
issue and defined the eventual remedy. The explanation here is dependant on the 
underlying substantive property claim.
It was clarified in NML that the source of a creditor’s contractual entitlement 
to compensation is the sovereign’s “promise to pay” which, in these cases, is also 
the source of the property rights of its creditors. There are therefore twin, 
interlinked justifications for enforcement: a failure of the sovereign to fulfil its 
promise to pay and the consequent damage to the creditor’s property rights. 
To justify enforcement, both the sovereign’s promise to pay and the creditor’s 
property rights are juridically significant. In enforcement litigation from Allied 
onwards, creditor’s property rights can only be protected if the sovereign fulfils its 
legal obligations to pay in full and on time. Here the combined justification for 
enforcement is a response to unique post-default circumstances. This combined 
justification also reflects how the courts manage the uncertainty inherent in the 
contracting context to achieve enforcement as an outcome. This intersection 
between the fulfilment of a sovereign’s promise and the property rights of creditors 
as the basis for judicial enforcement characterizes the commodity form of debt.
In the law, the debt contract is defined as C’s property. It is abstract, fixed 
a priori, and by definition once formed cannot change with the changing 
relationship between the parties or the changing transactional context (i.e., 
market conditions). The onus is on the courts in their enforcement role to ensure 
that C enjoys this property and that his or her enjoyment is protected whatever 
the cost to others. It is in this respect that the debt contract acquires its complete 
commodity form. The acquisition, use, and alienation (i.e., ownership rights) 
associated with a complete commodity do not have any externalities—or at 
least none that cannot be remedied with more enforcement action. Debt once 
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purchased can be enjoyed in full without hindrance.173 This fiction corresponds 
to the way in which commodities are assumed to flow in real markets: They are 
interchangeable with other commodities of the same type. They are fungible and 
commensurable in the sense that their value can be reduced to a market price as a 
common metric.174 The legal fiction described above justifies intervention aimed 
at ensuring that debt instruments remain liquid and tradable. Such intervention 
is akin to a regulatory role: Courts in their expansive enforcement role have 
become regulators.
As has been discussed above the history of sovereign debt is the history of 
the countervailing pressures that lead to the commodification of sovereign bonds. 
Debt as a commodity is a legal fiction to justify enforcement and, as will be 
shown, also (worryingly) justifies official intervention in sovereign debt markets. 
This commodity fiction, however, embodies “two opposite elements and neither 
of them can be taken to its logical extreme without annihilating the other.”175 
Legal uncertainty is an implication of the precarity that underpins the recognition 
of this legal fiction, which is discussed in Part III.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMMODITY FUNCTION
Whatever may be the problems of sovereign debt, the evolution of debt as a 
commodity fiction implicitly acknowledges that this fiction does not exist in 
real markets. Rather, it exists only as an outcome of courts’ negotiation of the 
structural flaws in the market. But as this paper has argued, these deliberations 
are not confined to the judicial imagination or abstract legal categories. They 
matter in the real world, as the experiences of Costa Rica, Argentina, and the 
exchange bondholders attest. In Contested Commodities, Margaret Jane Radin 
offers a terminology for exploring the dichotomy between deliberations and 
actions in the real world. She distinguishes between literal and metaphorical 
markets. In literal markets, “things are exchanged for money under certain social 
conditions. Sellers deliver goods to buyers’ buyers deliver money to sellers.”176 
In metaphorical markets, “social interactions that do not involve actually handing 
173. It is difficult to create a liquid market for a set of bonds when the various bonds within that 
set have different terms whose risks need to be evaluated and estimated individually.
174. The concept of commensurability is contested and the meaning adopted here is from 
Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities: The Trouble with Trade in Sex, Children, Body 
Arts and Other Things (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001) at 118.
175. Duncan Kennedy, “The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of 
Commodities” (1985) 34 Am U L Rev 939 at 961.
176. Radin, supra note 175 at 1.
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over money for goods are talked about as if they did.”177 Radin also suggests that 
for theoretical purposes, the metaphorical market “is not necessarily intended 
to reflect people’s actual understandings of themselves, their relationships, and 
activities, but rather to make accurate predictions.”178 As Radin understands it, 
commodification “elides literal and metaphorical markets … because there is no 
sharp divide between action and discourse—between the nature of a transaction 
and the discursive scheme or discursive framework in which we understand 
it.”179 My discussion of the conceptualization of sovereign debt as a commodity 
in law similarly straddles this divide between literal and metaphorical markets 
by offering a description of the reality of ‘literal’ sovereign debt litigation, the 
transactional context—which in turn is replete with the problems and inherent 
risks of sovereign lending—and the metaphorical scheme of contract law. This 
section extends this discussion with a view to drawing out the wider and deeper 
implications of the legal recognition of sovereign debt as a commodity. Apart 
from the fact that Radin’s concerns are also about commodification and are 
therefore relevant for the discussion at hand, at a general level the key motivation 
for choosing her conceptual scheme to begin this section is her discussion of 
“universal commodification” as a “methodological archetype”180 reflected in how 
neoclassical economic theorists see commodities in their theoretical frameworks.
A. THE METAPHORICAL MARKET
Is ‘NML enforcement’ informed by neoclassical economics, or is there evidence 
of theoretical influences that predate this literature? Gathii argues in his analysis 
of the Allied cases that the Second Circuit court was informed by classical legal 
thought of the “late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the period of early 
capitalism in the United States [where] the judicial response to holdouts has 
been to understand freedom of contract as embodying freely made choices.”181 
Further, these choices “should not be interfered with by either the lenders or 
borrowers or even the courts.”182 According to this worldview it is natural that 
debt contracts, once formed, should flow unhindered through the market, 
whatever the cost. Duncan Kennedy attributes the theoretical foundations of this 
view to neoclassical economics in his discussion about the role of law in economic 
177. Ibid.
178. Ibid.
179. Ibid at 2.
180. Ibid.
181. Gathii, supra note 50 at 269.
182. Ibid.
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thought.183 There is some evidence that the view of debt as a commodity is 
consistent with neoclassical economics. More specifically, enforcement litigation 
and neoclassical economics may share the same worldview—in which case the 
prior question that must be asked is: What is the role of law in this context?
Kennedy offers the following simplified and stripped down version of the 
role of law in neoclassical economics:
First, it is a condition of the theory of the efficiency of perfectly competitive markets 
that all valued experiences are commodities, and that there is no interference with 
exchange. Second, the model is often the basis for elaborate liberal arguments in 
favour of legislative reform designed to compensate for the inefficiency generated by 
deviations in the real world from the norm of competition.184
The question examined here is whether the view of debt as commodity as 
revealed in enforcement litigation shares the same understanding of the role of 
law. Kennedy’s view is consistent with how the modern literature on sovereign 
debt has framed the problem of debt. The key problem regarding sovereign debt 
examined in the first generation of modern economic literature which developed 
in the 1980s was: Why would sovereigns repay their debts in a world where 
there is no enforceable remedy against them, as their assets are immunized from 
attachment? The answer was that debt is repaid as “defaults are economically 
costly for the debtor country,”185 and that
Countries will be able to borrow up to the point in which the temptation to default 
is balanced by its costs. In standard theories of sovereign debt, this level of debt is 
generally below the level at which countries would like to be able to borrow.
It follows that attempts to reduce the costs of default could also reduce welfare 
because they would make sovereign debt more expensive and lower the maximum 
level of debt that a sovereign can accumulate. Conversely, attempts to improve 
enforcement could improve welfare even if they make debt crises more painful and 
protracted.186
The argument for defending enforcement (and resisting formal bankruptcy) 
was based on the ground that the alternative would eventually increase borrowing 
costs for debtors.187 Thus, according to this view, enforcement per se is necessary 
“to compensate [creditors] for the inefficiency generated by deviations in the 
183. Kennedy, supra note 176 at 960.
184. Ibid.
185. Sovereign Bankruptcy, supra note 35 at 5.
186. Ibid.
187. Ibid.
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real world from the norm of competition.”188 In this view the enforcement 
decisions are not only welcome but necessary.189 Implicit in this validation of 
enforcement is the idea that this regime is “the legal regime that corresponds 
to full commodification and freedom of exchange.”190 More specifically, from 
the neoclassical perspective the argument being made here is that with this 
legal regime in place “it makes sense to say that there is a determinate efficient 
outcome for a perfectly competitive regime.”191 It can be argued that the NML 
enforcement template replicates enforcement as an efficient outcome for a 
perfectly competitive market. The implications of this view are discussed in more 
detail in section C, which follows an examination of whether commodification is 
actually evidenced in the literal market.
B. THE LITERAL MARKET
The discussions in this section illustrate the ways in which the commodification 
of debt actually plays out in literal markets. In his amicus brief in support of 
Argentina’s writ of petition, Joseph Stiglitz highlights the wider implications of 
the NML decision for third parties.192 He emphasizes the externalities that arise 
from the decision. Stiglitz also discusses how the decision makes the pari passu 
clause a “guarantee that any future creditors of any future bond issuance will 
not receive payment before the holdouts of any previous litigation.”193 He states 
that the benefits to the holdouts far outweigh what any other affected party will 
receive.194 Stiglitz notes that the debtor will be adversely affected, as the decision 
allows the holdouts “to effectively thwart the debtor’s ability to issue future debt 
… at any time thereafter.”195 Further, the decision creates “new uncertainty 
about the country’s future and the size of its debt burden. The uncertainty itself 
would impede growth and access to credit, diminishing greatly the benefits of 
188. Kennedy, supra note 176 at 960.
189. This argument is similar to the putative argument expressed as a defence of the NML 
enforcement decision: “... some might argue that this is exactly the bargain struck by an 
issuer … At the time of the loan, a sovereign may reap he benefits of such a promise in the 
form of lower borrowing costs, greater market access, and the like. So why should anyone 
object when it is later held to its promise?” See Weidemaier, supra note 11 at 145.
190. Kennedy, supra note 176 at 961 [emphasis added].
191. Ibid.
192. Stiglitz, supra note 133.
193. Ibid at 5.
194. They “will obtain full payment on Argentina’s pre-default obligations—both principle 
and cumulative interest on defaulted bonds—rather than payment of the (marked down) 
restructured debt” (ibid at 6).
195. Ibid.
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debt restructuring”.196 Finally, Stiglitz argues that the decision “could imperil 
the IMF’s and the World Bank’s ability to perform essential functions”197 and, 
contrary to the opinion of the judge in the case, will trigger a “sovereign debt 
flight” away from the US markets.198
In the epilogue to their book The Three and a Half Minute Transaction, 
Mitu Gulati and Robert Scott also discuss the wider ramifications of the NML 
litigation. Their discussion illustrates the way in which the commodification 
of debt actually plays out in literal markets. They begin with a discussion of 
Ecuador—which defaulted on two of its bonds (due 2012 and 2030) in late 
2008 but continued to service a third set of bonds due in 2015. The country 
was in financial difficulties but could pay with oil revenues. The government 
argued that it was justified in defaulting on the first two bonds as these were 
issued illegitimately by the previous governments. Ecuador argued that the bonds 
“were lacking in requisite formalities” and challenged some standard features of 
the sovereign bonds “such as the acceptance of jurisdiction in New York and 
the waiver of sovereign immunity.”199 This led to a response by the affected 
creditor community and there was a discussion of whether they could use the 
pari passu clause to seize the payments made to the third group of bondholders. 
The creditors preferred the interpretation of the clause that had been accepted by 
the Belgian court in 2000 in Elliot Associates.200 Gulati and Scott note that this 
interpretation, “which seemed outrageous in the context of the Peruvian payments 
on its restructured debt in 2000, seemed to make intuitive sense with respect to 
Ecuador in 2009.”201 Although this course of action did not actually transpire, 
the episode has significant implications as it indicates the wider resonance of 
the idea that bondholder enjoyment should be protected and compensated 
through enforcement litigation, whatever the cost to third parties. The authors 
then discuss the Eurozone crisis, in which the litigation outcome would come 
to underpin the official sector response to the Greek debt crisis. They note that 
“the EU/IMF rescue facility that was put in place in early 2010” had a pari passu 
clause, and was “a loan facility designed to establish the rules governing the loan 
granted by the Eurozone nations to Greece.”202 Importantly, it was “not a public 
196. Ibid
197. Ibid at 14.
198. Ibid at 17.
199. Gulati & Scott, supra note 2 at 167.
200. Supra note 93.
201. Ibid at 168.
202. Ibid at 169.
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bond issuance.”203 The authors note that the inclusion of the clause suggests that 
it “provides the kind of protection that the creditors in this instance—the various 
eurozone nations participating in the loan to Greece—desired.”204 Although the 
clause was incorporated, it was not clear what its meaning was—or indeed what 
kind of protection the official creditors were getting because of it. The wider use 
of the pari passu clause is evidence—albeit slight—that debt as a commodity 
form elides both literal and metaphorical markets.
C. THE NATURE OF LEGAL INDETERMINACY
Following from the preceding discussion, debt is viewed as a commodity 
in a manner that indicates that the enforcement decisions were consistent 
with neoclassical assumptions about the role of law in competitive markets. 
As discussed in the preceding section, “there are many possible specifications of 
a commodity regime and many possible specifications of a contract regime based 
on the idea of freedom.”205 It has been argued that the legal regime established by 
the New York courts is a response to debtor intransigence in a particular default 
episode. The wider implications of attempts to replicate or ‘benchmark’ this 
response as an enforcement template are disturbing. Debt enforcement decisions 
are particular to their context, but so is the legal fiction of debt as a commodity. 
This particularity is the nature of legal indeterminacy that marks adversarial 
litigation. As Duncan Kennedy puts it, “there is no single set of property and 
contract rules that will generate an efficient outcome in every case, no matter 
what other conditions of the economic system.”206
Part III showed that a standard assumption in the metaphorical construction 
of property is that enforcement would increase welfare even if it is harsher on the 
debtor. This view was relied on to resist a formal framework for restructuring 
sovereign debt. The implicit assumption here is that common law enforcement 
decisions have what Kennedy describes as,
a peculiar, almost sacred status as symbols of ‘the efficient market solution …. They 
appear as a neutral background in everyone’s interest (efficiency) that is constantly 
threatened by the more partial, political interest-group based or ideologically based 
initiatives of legislatures.207
203. Ibid.
204. Ibid at 170.
205. Kennedy, supra note 175 at 961.
206. Ibid at 963.
207. Ibid at 964.
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My discussion of the sovereign debt litigation indicates such a move to fix the 
role of the law in sovereign debt markets. However, evidence from literal markets 
is consistent with Kennedy who argues that enforcement by common law courts 
is not “the efficient market solution to the problem of economic allocation; 
it was just one of many possible background regimes.”208 The NML enforcement 
template is thus a source of future legal uncertainty. Historical evidence indicates 
that there was never a common law enforcement template out there for “‘a free 
market regime’ that embodied the legal/economic requirements for efficient 
resource allocation.”209 The NML decision is not an exception to this trend. 
The outcome of that case reflects pressures on the courts to respond to debtor 
intransigence and offer remedies in the context of a wider fragmentation of the 
institutional configuration that so far has facilitated consensual debt workouts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Weidemaier argues, “Sovereign Bonds are treated like other contracts only when 
things are going well. An event of default triggers a conceptual shift in which 
political rather than legal concerns come to the fore.”210 This is true. On default, 
common law judges come to the fore with outcomes that are not confined to the 
four corners of a debt dispute.
Historically, on default, the enforcement of debt contracts has always 
justified assertions of public authority in sovereign debt markets. There is a 
long line of interventions that range from military action to further US foreign 
policy interests in nineteenth century Latin America211 to the recent US federal 
court decisions to rein in what the courts considered a recalcitrant debtor. The 
difference this time is that this incipient, judge-mediated enforcement regime 
threatens consensual market driven debt workouts. This is significant as the 
burden of post-crisis adjustments is shifted onto the citizens of the debtor state 
208. Ibid.
209. Ibid at 965.
210. Weidemaier, supra note 11 at 147.
211. See Louis A Pérez & Deborah M Weissman, “Public Power and Private Purpose: Odious 
Debt and the Political Economy of Hegemony” (2007) 32 NC Cent L Rev 699; Emily 
Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 
1900-1930 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999). Perez and Weissman 
provide a historical account of 19th century US government intervention that relied on 
debt obligations to widen its geopolitical influence in Latin America. Rosenberg provides a 
historical account of US intervention in Latin America that also relied on debt obligations 
and maps the creation of a cadre of financial administrators.
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and, through bailouts, onto taxpayers whose contributions fund bailouts. The case 
law analysis developed here opens up a space for a discussion about the necessity 
of intervention by other branches of government to remove the pressures on 
judges to fill structural gaps in the fragmenting institutional configurations that 
have—thus far—sustained debt workouts.
 “Judges” Lee Buchheit—a sovereign debt lawyer and legal expert—notes,
are … ill-equipped and ill-positioned to decide how the discomfort of a financial 
crisis can be apportioned among the citizens of the debtor country and the various 
classes of its creditors. Judges can only hand down judgements saying that as a 
matter of law, the sovereign is bound. They cannot prescribe the nature or degree of 
the sacrifices that the sovereigns would be needed to impose on its other stakeholders 
in order to make those payments or to satisfy those judgements.
Is it time to circumscribe their enforcement role?
